Rainey has never complied with the statutes requiring him to perform mandatory duties except 28 U.S.C. 1915(a). On 4/14/05 I filed a MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS. He approved it on 2/13/06, after 10 months’ delay.
From then on until today, he has never complied with Section 1915(d), which provides in pertinent part: “The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases.” In other words, none of the defendants in Civil Actions: 6:05-mc-00002 and V-06-78, 6:09-mc-11 Chen v. Cox, & 610-cv-00056 Chen v. Rainey have ever been served with Summons and my Complaints. As a result, none of the defendants have been before the court and the issues of controversy have never been presented before the court for adjudication. Thus, John D. Rainey and Janis Graham Jack have had neither subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction over the above cases, and they both have committed treason. Under the Supreme Law of the Land, whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5L.Ed 257 (1821).
Without subject matter jurisdiction, all the orders or judgments are VOID ab initio, and all my causes of action are subject to reinstatement under Rules Enabling Act Rule 1-041(E)(2), which provides that Plaintiff “may move for reinstatement of the case,” and, “upon good cause shown, the court shall reinstate the case.”
In the Order of 1/15/2008, Rainey stated in pertinent part: “The court will not reinstate Plaintiff’s complaints — regarding this matter.”
All the Orders and/or Judgments rendered in 6:05-mc-00002 and V-06-78, 6:09-mc-11 Chen v. Cox, & 610-cv-00056 are VOID ab initio for violating 28 USC Section 1915(d) and Rules Enabling Act Rule 1-041(E)(2), which make it a mandatory duty for Rainey to reinstate those cases. Despite my repeated requests for reinstatement of the Complaints, he denied them without giving any reason. Thus, my causes of action have been equitably tolled.
When I sued him on August 31, 2010, and asked him to recuse or disqualify himself, he refused and continued rendering VOID Orders. See PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE SIX COMPLAINTS Posted on April 22, 2012. On July 24, 2010, I was forced to sue him again, and he could not but assign the case to Janis Graham Jack, who conspired with him by giving me 2 minutes at her lunch break and throwing me out of the courtroom, which she usurped in complete absence of jurisdiction. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE SIX COMPLAINTS FILED IN V-06-78 Posted on April 17, 2012.
My two TRO Motions were sent to Chief Judge Hayden Head on July 30, 2010, but were transferred to him on August 10, 2009. He sat on my emergency motions for 11.5 months, and on July 12, 2010, without having the Clerk serve process pursuant to 28 USC Section 1915(d), he issued a void MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER as follows (See CHEN v. COX No. V-09-11. – Leagle.com | Leagle):
1. Plaintiff’s requests to proceed in Forma Pauperis (Dkt. Nos. 1 & 16) are GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to return the $350 “borrowed check” to Plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for a Court-Appointed Attorney (Dkt. No. 2) is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Have All the Documents in this Case Sealed (Dkt. No. 11) is DENIED.
4. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED.
5. Plaintiff’s Motion Objecting to South Port Alto MUD Petition (Dkt. No. 9) is DENIED.
6. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for Removal of Civil Rights Cases from the State Court to the District Court Pursuant to § 1443 (Dkt. No. 12) is DENIED.
7. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion Suggesting Voluntary Recusal of Judges under Special Circumstances (Dkt No. 13) is DENIED.
8. Plaintiff is ORDERED file a concise complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 within 15 days after the date of this Order.3
9. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, or any other order of the Court, this action shall be dismissed.
VOID ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
The above rulings are in complete absence of jurisdiction and are VOID ab initio. A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity. Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). Also, a void judgment has been defined as “one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at anytime and at any place directly or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758).
If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void. Pifer v. Pifer, 31 N.C. App. 486, 229 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1976).
A judgment entered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992). Also, it is the longstanding rule that such a void judgment may be attacked at any time in any proceeding. Id. ; Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988); Lammers Land & Cattle Co. v. Hans, 213 Neb. 243, 328 N.W.2d 759 (1983).
A judgment issued from a proceeding that violates a citizen’s right to due process is void. State v. Rehbein, 235 Neb. 536, 455 N.W.2d 821 (1990); State v. Von Dorn, 234 Neb. 93, 449 N.W.2d 530 (1989); State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d 609 (1975); In re Application of Maher, North v. Dorrance, 144 Neb. 484, 13 N.W.2d 653 (1944); In re Betts, 36 Neb. 282, 54 N.W. 524 (1893). A void judgment may be set aside at any time and in any proceeding. VonSeggern v. Willman, 244 Neb. 565, 508 N.W.2d 261 (1993); Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992); State v. Ewert,; Ehlers v. Grove, 147 Neb. 704, 24 N.W.2d 866 (1946); Hayes County v. Wileman, 82 Neb. 669, 118 N.W. 478 (1908). ‘A void judgment may be attacked at any time in any proceeding.’”
Orders or “[j]udgments entered contrary to due process are void.” Neylan v. Vorwald, 121 Wis.2d 481, 488, 360
If a court’s decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void for Rule 1-060(B) purposes, even if the court had personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995). In my cases, Rainey violated 28 USC Section 1915(d), Rules Enabling Act Rule 1-041(E)(2) and my Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, making his Orders and Judgments VOID.
RECUSAL AND/OR DISQUALIFICATION
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality. If a judge’s attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified.” [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) “is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.”) (“Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.”).
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.”).
The above case law applicable to my cases should apply to USA v. Citgo, et al., too.
Rainey slept on the crime victims’ rights for seven long years after the jury’s conviction of Citgo. This is in violation of their right to speedy trial, Due Process and Equal Protection under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, making his purported MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER rendered on April 30, 2014 VOID ab initio.
TO BE CONTINUED.
Paul Chen