A BOOK FOR RANDALL W. HILL, ESQ. TO READ WITH CARE AND WITH SHAME!

“Adversarial writing does not engage in fraud or obfuscation about the facts and law concerning the matter—nothing can be gained from lying and cheating except defeat and disbarment. The briefs and memoranda you will file with the court and serve on the opponents [sha]ll not lie about the facts and misstate the law. — The applicable law will not be distorted or outright misstated by you, —. Lawyers wear several hats in contested matters. They are an officer of the court, bound to uphold the law and promote justice. Attorneys who lie and cheat about the facts and the law certainly violate the law.” Adversarial Legal Writing and Oral Argument (Legal Research and Writing) by Michael D. Murray.

Upon reading the above statement, I cannot but think of RANDALL W. HILL’S PERJURY & SUMMARY JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH SKIPPER KOETTER Posted at ricofraudonthecourt.com on October 20, 2014. I suggest that Mr. Hill spend some time reading this book with care and with shame, and that he expect to see the day when the Orders/Judgments he obtained by committing fraud on the court in conspiracy with Judge Skipper Koetter vacated, reversed and set aside by the Texas Thirteenth Court of Appeals.

Paul Chen

JUDGE KOETTER RENDERED VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS WITH NEITHER JURISDICTION NOR DUE PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

The following seven Orders or Judgments founded upon the 7/2/1996 VOID Trustee’s Deed which had been obtained by the wrongful foreclosure of Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI), a non-existent corporation, were rendered by Judge Koetter without any power, authority or jurisdiction:

• 7/15/10 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
• 7/16/10 DEFAULT JUDGMENT
• 11/30/10 ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS
• 11/30/10 FINAL JUDGMENT
• 4/11/12 ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
• 5/15/13 FINAL ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
• 6/17/14 ORDER OF DISMISSAL

ARGUMENT

1. It is the judiciary’s responsibility to promote and provide fair and equal treatment to all parties. Individual judges are charged with the task of adjudicating claims in a manner that protects the rights of both parties. See In re Thomas, 873 S.W.2d 477, 496-97 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994) (citations omitted). Judge Koetter has never taken his responsibility to promote and provide fair and equal treatment to Chen in all the cases before him. He is charged with the task of adjudicating claims in a manner that protects the rights of both parties. But his arbitrary rulings and misconduct demonstrate bias, prejudice, partiality, favoritism, unfairness, and injustice contrary to the task imposed on him.
2. In conspiracy with the attorneys involved in these cases, and David Roberts, Esq., Judge Koetter committed fraud on the 10-6-28, 10-6-29, 10-6-13752 & 12-4-1596 Courts by proceeding to hear the cases and making decisions without any power, authority or jurisdiction.
3. Chen contends that due process was not accorded him and other interested parties. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction failed in these Koetter courts because Judge Koetter:

1) engaged in unlawful activity, particularly accepting $5,900.10 from one of the Plaintiffs, David Roberts and his law firm, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP. before and after the July 15, 2010 hearing. — Is the $5,900.10 to be regarded as a bribe, a reward or a campaign contribution or all of the above?

2) signed, immediately after the July 15, 2010 hearing, the purported Judicial Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusion drafted and prepared in advance by Plaintiffs’ three seasoned attorneys, Kenneth Burch, Carl Haddard, Richard Morrison, Assistant DA Shannon Salyer, et al. without changing a single word, without glancing at Chen’s pleadings filed on the record, and by giving away his bias, prejudice, discrimination, partiality and favoritism with his obvious body language. “It was patently unfair to the Defendant, who has not had “ample opportunity” to argue for or against the findings.” See In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1987); see also In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1311. (“When an interested party is permitted to draft a judicial order without response by or notice to the opposing side, the temptation to overreach and exaggerate is overwhelming.”) Id. The record shows that the hearing started at 9 a.m. and ended at about 10.00 a.m., that the void JUDICIAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW REGARDING DOCUMENTATION OR INSTRUMENT P[E]RPORTING TO CREATE AS L[EI]N OR CLAIM prepared by Plaintiffs’ attorneys in advance was filed at 10:07 a.m. with Judge Koetter’s signature without considering Chen’s challenges of, inter alia, subject matter jurisdiction filed on the record.

3) did not act impartially and did not even have any appearance of impartiality by allowing the three opposing attorneys to approach the bench, by smilingly signing their prepared Order/Judgment without any change, and by not even glancing at Chen’s Pleadings immediately after the 7/15/10 hearing. See Bracey V Warden, U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997).

4) failed to recuse himself in the proceedings where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned: Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) protects the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary by requiring a judge to recuse in any proceeding where “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “The standard is ‘whether an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.’” In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 144, 455(a) (judge’s “impartiality might be reasonably questioned) and Christo v. Padgett, 233 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)). The judge’s intentions or motivations for engaging in the ex parte communications or acceptance of campaign contribution are irrelevant to the inquiry; rather, the inquiry is an objective one which asks whether the judge’s acceptance of $5,900.10 from the attorney and his law firm that are Plaintiffs in the proceedings before him would raise in the mind of a fully informed lay observer questions regarding his impartiality. The answer to that question here can only be “yes.” Furthermore, Judge Koetter was one of the defendants in Chen’s June 4, 2012 Section 1983 Civil Rights Action, which triggered his constitutional disqualification. See Juergen “Skipper” Koetter: U.S. v. Will says you are engaged in an act of treason! May I call you traitor, then? July 22, 2014 and other posts related to Judge Koetter.

5) did not follow statutory procedure by requiring Plaintiffs to prove existence of subject matter jurisdiction when Chen challenged the court’s lack of it. Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill 140, 143 (1921) (If a court’s decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void), See e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995); Assumed Business or Professional Name Act; 1st & 14^th Amendments to the US Constitution; Open Courts Doctrine of Texas Constitution.

6) exceeded his statutory authority, denied Chen’s 1st Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances, deprived Chen of “life, liberty, property” guaranteed by the 14^th Amendment to the US Constitution, disregarded the Open Courts Doctrine of Texas Constitution, and violated the Assumed Business or Professional Name Act, §71.201 (a) of the Business and Commerce Code and Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code by willfully, erroneously, and  maliciously labeling him “a vexatious litigant”, charging him with filing “frivolous” lawsuits and prohibiting him from filing any new petitions in the State of Texas, among others.

7) violated due process in holding the July 15, 2010 hearing by ambush (lack of pretrial discovery thwarted justice, subverted, undermined, and impeded Chen’s fact-finding ability, and unfairly hampered the presentation of his counterclaims and affirmative defenses), and rendering the November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment for the factually and legally non-existent corporation, ARPI, which has had no standing since 6/5/1993 when its Assumed Name Certificate expired without any renewal. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019(193; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936).

8) committed fraud upon the court by acting in manner inconsistent with due process of law and acting unconstitutionally in entering the purported orders and final judgments despite ARPI’s lack of standing, the courts’ lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Attorney Randal W. Hill’s perjury. See In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill, App. 3d 393(1962).

9) committed fraud in the procurement of jurisdiction in conspiracy with Plaintiffs Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, ARPI, David Roberts, and their attorneys, Kenneth Burch, Carl Haddard, Richard Morrison, et al., See Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E. 2d 893 (1985).

10) misinterpreted NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS and was ignorant of the 87+ Texas precedents, e.g., (a) A notice of lis pendens is privileged even if filed in connection with a suit not lawfully supporting the filing. See Prappas v. Meyerland Community Improvement Ass’n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. App. – Houston [14^th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); (b) The lis pendens filing was absolutely privileged, even if there was not statutory basis for the filing. Id. See also Manders v. Manders, 897 F.Supp. 972, 976 (S.D. Tex. 1995); (c) Prappas also concluded that the absolute privilege is not lost if the notice of lis pendens fails to include all required statutory elements. See Id. At 798. (See AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING filed in Case 2010-CR-0234 & Case 2010-CR-0235 on August 31, 2010.)  

11) founded the June 15, 2014 ORDER OF DISMISSAL on the VOID November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment without affording Chen an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

CONCLUSION

Tainted by judicial errors, Plaintiffs’ lack of standing, and the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, each of the above seven Orders or Judgments is merely a piece of waste paper, an absolute nullity. See Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). “A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity.” Also, a void judgment has been defined as “one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place directly or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758); City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973); People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994). It has also been held that “It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or[,] collateral.” Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.).

Paul Chen

RANDALL W. HILL’S PERJURY & SUMMARY JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH SKIPPER KOETTER

Is this Judge Juergen (Skipper) Koetter?

Is he the judge bribed  or rewarded $1,850.10 $5,900.10 by David Roberts, & Roberts Roberts Odefey Witte LLP before and after the 7/15/2010 hearing? 

$1,850.10 to win a lawsuit? Isn’t that quite cheap? Sorry, I was mistaken. It was $5,900.10.

See the new posts: SKIPPER KOETTER IS MERELY ONE OF THE RACKETEERS; SO IS JUDGE WILLIAMS! Posted on September 25, 2013 & TEXAS RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE & CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Posted on October 4, 2013.

“Fraud and falsehood only dread examination. Truth invites it.” — Samuel Johnson quotes (English Poet, Critic and Writer. 1709-1784)

See WARNINGS TO RANDAL W. HILL, ESQ.: YOU VIOLATED TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT! Posted on September 24, 2013; RANDY HILL COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH JUDGE SKIPPER KOETTER, ANITA L. KOOP + TEXAS GANG Posted on May 17, 2013.

 So this is the lawyer, RANDALL W. HILL, who committed perjury and fraud on the court to win the SUMMARY JUDGMENT in conspiracy with Judge Koetter despite his clients’ lack of standing and the court’s lack of jurisdiction!

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Corrupt judges like John D. Rainey, Janis Graham Jack, S. Thomas Anderson, Skipper Koetter, Kemper Stephen Williams; unethical lawyers like Richard T. Chapman, David Roberts, Randal W. Hill, Jameson B. Carroll, Emily T. Landry, Ron McAfee, Edward Bearman; ignorant/discriminatory ADA Shannon Salyer, Sheriff B.B. Browning & Magistrate Hope Kurtz, crooks and fraudsters like Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and those named and unnamed in my posts: They have seized upon the government by bribery and corruption. They have made speculation and public robbery a science. They have loaded the nation, the state, the county, and the city with debt. — Quotes from Denis Kearney (1847–1907), a late 19th century California labor leader, applied to some Texas’s and Tennessee’s rotten, immoral, despicable OFFICERS OF THE COURT and two major crooks and fraudsters.

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Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom.

While teaching, I also worked undercover in the lower courts by saying I was a young law teacher wanting experience in criminal law. The judges were happy to assist me but what I learned was how corrupt the lower courts were. Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom. —  Samuel Dash

Samuel Dash (February 27, 1925 – May 29, 2004) was an American professor of law who acted as a co-chief counsel along with Fred Thompson for the Senate Watergate Committee during the Watergate scandal. Dash became famous for his televised interrogations during the hearings held by the United States Congress on the Watergate incident. — From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ha! Judge Skipper Koetter seems a lot wiser in that he concealed the moneys under the cover of campaign contributions and that he managed not to accept money in the courtroom, I guess.  But a reasonable man cannot rule out his accepting money in his chambers, bedchambers, or living room, can he? One of my former attorneys mentioned that the most effective way for money to change hands had been knowingly and willfully losing the chips to the judge in the poker game in a private group. See Judge Skipper Koetter’s Campaign Finance Suspected of Bribery Posted on September 29, 2012.

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FINAL ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is VOID ab initio.

Do you know that the non-movant’s failure to respond to the motion in the trial court should not result in a judgment by default, CONSPIRATORS? See Paragraphs 17 through 19 for details. Not to mention that the plaintiffs had no standing and the court had no subject matter jurisdiction.

Do you know that a case like this, dismissal is mandatory, not discretionary?

Not only do you have power but duty to dismiss the case instead of being forced to render another VOID Order to waste judicial resources, Conspirator, Racketeer, Trespasser, Imposter, Traitor? Shall I share with you some case law depicting the traits of these Role Models whom you represent all in one, Private Citizen Koetter? Are you sitting on the bench in the kangaroo court?

A kangaroo court is “a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted”.^[1] It is essentially where the defendant has already been deemed guilty, and has little if any opportunities to object or defend himself or herself.

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1. The “fraud on the court” doctrine rests on two distinct features.
First, as the Tenth Circuit has explained in Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1045 (1996), “whatever else it embodies, [fraud on the court] requires a showing that one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court.”
Second, as the Tenth Circuit explained in Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), the deception must go to the heart of the judicial proceeding, creating an impression about the core, operative facts that is relied on by the court and is false. “Fraud on the court … is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself.”

2. The purported FINAL ORDER is not final; it is VOID ab initio because 1) Plaintiffs have no standing; 2) the Court had no jurisdiction; 3) Randal W. Hill, Plaintiffs’ counsel, committed perjury and fraud on the court in conspiracy with Judge Skipper Koetter, who has been one of the defendants in lawsuits Chen filed in the record; 4) Judge Koetter should have recused himself, but he rendered the ORDER without any power, authority or jurisdiction; and 5) Lacking jurisdiction, private citizen Koetter is guilty of Racketeering, Abuse and Misuse of Judicial Power, Trespassing, Usurpation, Conspiracy, Corruption, and Treason.

Oh, help me, God! I sinned! I lied under oath! I perjured!

I’m demanding to be prosecuted. I’m begging to be prosecuted for perjury. — George Galloway

Mr. Hill & Mr. Roberts: Are you as conscience-stricken as this brother of yours? I believe he is truly remorseful! Are you? Be truthful! “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” — John 8:32

3. Even if the court had jurisdiction, the purported FINAL ORDER violated the Open Courts Doctrine of Texas Constitution and Chen’s due process and equal protection rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

4. And the purported FINAL ORDER pronounced lacked the three elements of jurisdiction: 1) subject matter; 2) persons/parties; 3) entry of record, not authorized by law, and so was rendered without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of Texas and that of the United States.

5. Plaintiffs deprived Defendant of his “life, liberty and property” guaranteed by the 14^th Amendment without due process of law and denied him the equal protection of the laws. BALLARD V. HUNTER, 204 U.S. 241 (1907)

6. Where a litigant had the benefit of a full and fair trial in the state courts, and his rights are measured, not by laws made to affect him individually, but by general provisions of law applicable to all those in like condition, he is not deprived of property without due process of law, even if he can be regarded as deprived of his property by an adverse result. Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).

7. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884). “Due process of law is [process which], following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.” Id. at 708; Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).

8. “[P]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).

9. Thus, the required elements of due process are those that “minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations” by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests.   The core of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process may also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record, and that a party be allowed to be represented by counsel. ⁶⁸⁸ Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).

10. The laws or the enforcement of the laws of the State of Texas come under the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment because they infringed fundamental rights.

11. In In re Discount Rental, Inc., the per curiam Court conditionally issued a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate an order that a judgment debtor’s property be sold to satisfy a void judgment. (Com#6)

12. A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea by which a party challenges a court’s authority to determine the subject matter of the action. Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The purpose of a dilatory plea is not to force the plaintiffs to preview their case on the merits but to establish a reason why the merits should never be reached. Id. Prohibition is the proper remedy, where an inferior court assumes to exercise judicial power not granted by law.

13. Attorney Randal W. Hill is guilty of perjury and shall be fined under 18 USC § 1621 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.  See VOID ORDERS and  Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc.   The trial court conducted a hearing; agreed that plaintiff had deliberately concealed her pre-existing back condition; and dismissed her suit with prejudice for fraud on the court. The Third DCA affirmed. Here, Attorney Randal W. Hill’s false or misleading statement given under oath concerning issues central to his case amounted to fraud. See Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). He deliberately concealed the fact that Chen sent the Replies to the Clerk by CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED: 7011 1570 0002 7183 on May 7, 2013 and reciprocally sent him the filed documents by e-mail on the same day. See 5 7 13 PAUL CHEN’S COVER LETTER TO CLERK BY CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 7011 1570 0002 7183 0203 & 5 7 13 Paul Chen’s E-mail to Randal W. Hill, Esq. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to render the purported FINAL ORDER procured by fraud on the court based on Mr. HILL’s intentional misrepresentation: “The response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment was first “posted” by Chen on May 13, 2013” and “Prior to submission of the motion, the Plaintiffs lodged their objection to the timeliness and improper service of Defendant Chen’s Response and said objection was granted” was an abuse of discretion and deliberate indifference to Chen’s constitutional rights. See Rosenthal v. Rodriguez, 750 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). See RANDY HILL COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH JUDGE KIPPER KOETTER, ANITA L. KOOP + TEXAS GANG Posted on May 17, 2013.

Randall W. Hill, the attorney for my opponents, lied under oath, and committed fraud on the court by showing Judge Koetter all the wrong directions except the one highlighted, which is the right way to find the facts to support his legal conclusions.

14. As set forth in Rosenthal v. Rodriguez, 750 So. 2d 703,704 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000): Courts throughout this state have repeatedly held “that a party who has been guilty of fraud or misconduct in the prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding should not be permitted to continue to employ the very institution it has subverted to achieve her ends.” Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen, 736 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (quoting Hanono v. Murphy, 723 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); O’Vahey v. Miller, 644 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

15. “[T]o justify reversal, it would have to be shown on appeal that the trial
court clearly erred in its interpretation of the facts and the use of its judgment and not merely that the court, or another fact-finder, might have made a different factual determination.” See Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983); Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 82-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

16. Chen asserts that there was clear and convincing evidence that Attorney Randal W. Hill had set into motion an “unconscionable scheme” to interfere with “the judicial system’s ability to impartially adjudicate the matter.” See Jacob v. Henderson, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D286 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan.24, 2003). The record before the court demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of fraud; Chen has unequivocally “shown that the sanction imposed is unreasonable” and that the trial court “clearly erred in its interpretation of the facts and the law.” See Baker v. Myers Tractor Services, Inc., 765 So. 2d 151, (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)

The non-movant’s failure to respond to the motion in the trial court should not result in a judgment by default.

Neiher attorney Randall W. Hill nor Judge Skipper Koetter knows about this controlling precedent! Shame on them!

17. When the motion does not present any grounds in support of summary judgment, the non-movant is not required to except to it in the trial court. See McConnell v. Southside Independent School District, 858 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1993); see also Mercantile Ventures, Inc. v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 902 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no writ). The reasoning is that the motion must stand or fall on its own merits, and the non-movant’s failure to respond or except to the motion in the trial court should not result in a judgment by default. See McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 342.

18. Where the summary judgment motion presents some grounds, but not all, once again the non-movant is not required to except to the trial court because to do so in this situation would require the non-movant to alert the movant to the additional grounds that he left out of his summary judgment motion. See id. See also DeWoody v. Rippley, 951 S.W.2d 935, 944 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ dism’d by agr.).

19. The movant is entitled to file a reply to the non-movant’s response. However, Rule 166a does not set forth any time requirements for filing a movant’s reply based solely upon legal arguments. See TEX. R.  CIV. P. 166A; Knapp v. Eppright, 783 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 1989, no writ). The movant could file this reply the very day of the hearing  on his motion. See Knapp v. Eppright, 783 S.W.2d at 296; Wright v. Lewis, 777 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).

20. Based on 17 through 19 above,  the rulings: “The response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment was first “posted” by Chen on May 13, 2013” and “Prior to submission of the motion, the Plaintiffs lodged their objection to the timeliness and improper service of Defendant Chen’s Response and said objection was granted” are erroneous in addition to the court’s lack of power, authority, and jurisdiction to hear and decide the case absent the Plaintiffs’ standing.

21. The non-movant must file and serve the response, accompanying evidence or special exceptions or objections to the movant’s no-evidence motion not later than seven days before the hearing. See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993); Crews v. Plainsman Trading Co., 827 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied). The non-movant can file the response on the seventh day before the hearing – there does not have to be seven full days. See Thomas v. Medical Arts Hosp., 920 S.W.2d 815, 817-18 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Wright v. Lewis, 777 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); Benger Builders, Inc. v. Business Credit Leasing, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, writ denied). Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5, the non-movant can also use the mail to file his response, and if he does, it is considered timely filed on the day it is deposited in the mail so long as it reaches the clerk no more than ten days after it is due. See Geiselman v. Cramer Fin. Group, 965 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ); Clendennen v. Williams, 896 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ).  This means Chen could have filed the response, accompanying evidence or special exceptions or objections on 5/9/13 and is still timely. Therefore, having filed them on 5/7/13, Chen has unequivocally defeated the charge of untimeliness by two days.

22. As to the “improper service” charge, it is again the clerk’s duty under Amendment to Rule 145 of T.R.C.P. signed and ordered by Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson and the other Justices on 9/19/2005 taking effect on 12/1/2005 in all pending cases.

THIS CASE further demonstrates why private citizen Koetter is a Racketeer, Abuser and Misuser of Judicial Power, Trespasser, Usurper, Conspirator, Corruptor, and Traitor — ALL IN ONE!

Imagine you both standing behind bars!

How do you feel about being locked up in a prison cell like this, Mr. Hill?

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See AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION; & AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE, 42 USC § 1985, CIVIL CONSPIRACY & RICO CLAIMS for details.

See the new post:

WARNINGS TO RANDAL W. HILL, ESQ.: YOU VIOLATED TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT! Posted on September 24, 2013.

Ha! Ha! Ha! Koetter believed my misleading statement so easily!

Getting a summary judgment granted is a piece of cake!

 Please click: Mr. Rainey: Why did you sit on my TRO Motions for 11.5 months without taking any actions while others were issued in an hour with a phone call or in one day?July 31, 2014; Koetter, the worst judge in Texas, second only to Rainey, the most corrupt federal judge! July 30, 2014.

RAINEY’S $0 RESTITUTION & 7-YEAR SENTENCING DELAY AFTER JURY’S GUILTY VERDICT CLEARLY VIOLATED CVRA!

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CVRA

The statement of Sen. Jon Kyl & that of Sen. Dianne Feinstein in Senate Debate at S4268-69 make it clear that Rainey’s violations are prohibited by the Statute, i.e., CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT (CVRA).

Rainey’s handling of the USA v. CITGO, ET AL case unequivocally violated the 1^st, 5^th, 6^th, and 7^th Amendments to the United States Constitution and the statute, i.e., CVRA, in particular.

Thus, the entire proceedings are VOID ab initio. It must be vacated. The criminal victims should sue him for civil liabilities, and render him constitutionally disqualified to preside over the case since day one, a new trial or a new sentencing!

In the CVRA’s predecessor proposal to add a victims’ rights amendment to the Constitution, Congress sought to address the tension between victims’ interest in ensuring the vitality of their rights by making it difficult to override or restrict them, and countervailing interests based on the need for flexibility in the administration of criminal justice and the historic constitutional rights of the accused. The last version to be favorably reported to the Senate provided that victims’ rights “shall not be denied . . . and may be restricted only as provided in this article.” S.J. Res. 1, § 1 (108th Cong.) (emphasis added). See U.S. v. TURNER, 367 F. Supp.2d 319, 0 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

With respect to CVRA, Rainey unequivocally violated the 800+ crime victims’ pertinent statutory rights:

(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused:

“A 2009 blast nearly sent a cloud of hydrogen fluoride, a deadly gas, into the neighborhoods.

Residents’ complaints to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality — more than 200 of them during the 10-year period — led the agency to inspect Citgo repeatedly, but the company covered its tracks. During the conviction phase of the federal trial, the Justice Department showed that Citgo employees removed the oil from the uncovered tanks each time the refinery was due for an inspection, so that by the time an investigator arrived, the company was operating legally. It wasn’t until a TCEQ investigator arrived unannounced that the agency realized Citgo was operating the tanks illegally.” For more detailed CITGO intentional violations, see Oil Giant Citgo Gets Off Easy in Criminal Case – Truthout.

(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding:

On December 9, 2013, the prosecutors, the victims’ counsel, and approximately one hundred crime victims appeared at the courthouse for the sentencing hearing that had been announced previously. Rainey purposefully absented from the courthouse. Perhaps he was hiding in his chambers or in the restroom. (In CIVIL ACTION NO. V-10-56 Chen v. Rainey, at the purported Initial Pretrial and Scheduling Conference scheduled on September 22, 2010 at 1:15 p.m., which was abruptly moved to the crooked judge Janis Graham Jack’s lunchtime break, he was absent from the 2-minute hearing while sitting on the bench across the hall.) So were CITGO’s counsel, who apparently knew in advance there was to be no sentencing that day and did not show up.) The sentencing was postponed. — This is another abuse and misuse of judicial power.

      “Where are you, Judge Rainey?” asked the victims.

Victims asked the bailiff to look for you in your chambers in vain! You were clever and cunning enough to hide behind the desk, John Delay Rainey!

Which room were you hiding when the courtroom was packed with prosecutors, CITGO’S victims, and their attorneys awaiting your sentencing on December 9, 2013? Why did you chicken out, Mr. Rainey? And again, where did you hide yourself on April 30, 2014 when the victims’ restitution was announced in writing instead of in open court? Guilt and Shame for your gross misconduct?

Judge John Delay Rainey is guilty of deprivation of the crime victims’ statutory and constitutional rights!

(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding: The 4/30/2014 restitution order should have been announced in an open court instead of electronic filing of a written order by intentionally excluding the victims from such a public court proceeding.

(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding: Restitution order is a part of sentencing. Depriving the victims of the right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding on 4/30/2014 when the MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER was rendered. See 06-563 – USA v. CITGO Petroleum Corporation et al. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503,23 LEd 398.

(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.

(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law:

“[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)-(6). Awarding the 800+ crime victims $0 restitution violated their right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. Having been designated crime victims through open-court hearings, these victims were entitled to at least some compensation for the harms inflicted on them from 1994 through 2003, not to mention other uncharged crimes committed by CITGO 2003. $0 restitution was unthinkable, unacceptable legally and ethically! Thelma Morgan had pneumonia, her husband developed colon cancer and died in 2003, Connie Gonzalez developed breast cancer, and her husband had prostate cancer and heart problems. In fact, all the 800+ crime victims have been exposed to the chemicals coming from the CITGO refinery. They all deserve medical screening: Screening is the systematic application of a test or inquiry, to identify individuals at sufficient risk of a specific disorder to benefit from further investigation or direct preventive action, among persons who have not sought medical attention on account of symptoms of that disorder. See Guidance on terminology – Journal of Medical Screening. Screening, in medicine, is a strategy used in a population to identify an unrecognized disease in individuals without signs or symptoms. This can include individuals with pre-symptomatic or unrecognized symptomatic disease. See Screening (medicine) – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay:

“The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7). This provision appears to confer participatory rights on the victim. The affirmative right to be heard applies to a variety of specified proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). The provision is a surviving evidence of the earlier proposal to amend the Constitution by providing, in relevant part, that victims have “the right to adjudicative decisions that duly consider the victim’s . . . interest in avoiding unreasonable delay.” S.J. Res. 1, § 2 (108th Cong.); see S. Rep. 108-191 at 27. The Senate sponsors of the CVRA were explicit in their view that the statutory right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay neither “curtail[s] the Government’s need for reasonable time to organize and prosecute its case” nor “infringe[s] on the defendant’s due process right to prepare a defense.” See Senate Debate at S4268-69 (statement of Sen. Kyl). On the other hand delays for other reasons, particularly “for the mere convenience of the parties,” must take into account the victim’s countervailing interest in a speedy trial. Id. at S4269 (statement of Sen. Kyl).

Under the statute’s phrasing — which could be interpreted, by contrast to the proposed constitutional amendment, to grant victims a more robust right to object to delay — a victim could conceivably object to scheduling decisions on the ground that the resulting delay would be unreasonable.

The Waiver Of Speedy Trial Time: “On April 29, 2005, I entered, at the parties’ joint request, an order of excludable delay pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8). Although I recognize that I did so without the benefit of any victim input, I concluded that the brief period of delay the parties proposed — 35 days — would not unduly delay the proceedings and was otherwise warranted in the interest of justice.” See U.S. v. TURNER, 367 F. Supp.2d 319, 0 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Judge Orenstein’s 35 days’ delay is reasonable.  In contrast, Rainey’s seven years’ delay is callous, capricious, arbitrary, unreasonable, egregious, and unconscionable. The most puzzling is the three years and nine months of inactivity (between December 22, 2007 and March 27, 2011) evidenced from the Docket Report 06-563 – USA v. CITGO Petroleum Corporation et al.

 I am not guilty! All the delays complied with Judge Rainey’s instructions! He is hiding behind the desk in his chambers now!

(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity:

“The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). The Senate sponsors of the law were clear in their articulating their intent: to promote a liberal reading of the statute in favor of interpretations that promote victims’ interest in fairness, respect, and dignity. “It is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled down or marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. This legislation is meant to correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal process.” See Senate Debate at S4269 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).

• To conform to the sponsors’ expectation that the statute will be applied liberally to the extent consistent with other law, Rainey failed to promote victims’ interest in fairness, respect, and dignity by violating the CVRA in USA v. CITGO’s case by depriving the 800+ crime victims of their legitimate rights to fair and just restitution.
• “The only way to give effect to [the victim’s] right to speak as guaranteed to him by the CVRA is to vacate the sentence and hold a new sentencing hearing.” See In re: Kenna, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006). The CVRA was designed to show that the criminal justice system “can and should care about both the rights of accused and the rights of victims.” 150 Cong. Rec. S4262 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). Just as CITGO has a right to hear its sentence announced, so do the 800+ crime victims have a right to hear their restitution announced in open court.
• 
• TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

* Click Images for judge skipper koetter’s corruption, and you will see 12 photos. Click any one of them,  wait awhile, and it will take you to more than 70 images linking to my BLOG. Have these given you sleepless nights, Skipper and John?

John Delay Rainey: Actual Ignorance of the Speedy Trial Act Applied in Other VCRA Cases or Deliberate Indifference???

Either Actual Ignorance or Deliberate Indifference to it is inexcusable, John! I will cite some case law to show and tell you how wrong you were in taking seven years to announce your sentencing on February 5, 2014 after the jury’s conviction of CITGO’S two counts of criminal offenses on June 27, 2007. And it was even more outrageous to postpone your written restitution order until April 30, 2014 without the presence of the crime victims, not to mention their “right to speak directly to you and to be heard in person.”

Your delay is not seven hours but seven years, Mr. Delay Rainey.

 

After delaying the sentencing for seven years, you awarded the crime victims nothing under CVRA.

Instead of letting them wait for seven years in uncertainty, why didn’t you simply cancel the sentencing and dismiss the case upon the jury’s guilty verdict on June 27, 2007? It would have saved enormous judicial resources and taxpayers’ money!

“The CVRA gives victims the right to speak directly to the judge at sentencing.” The phrase “to be reasonably heard” is ambiguous, but the legislative history “makes it clear that the CVRA created a right to be heard in person.” Finally, the court concluded that a victim’s right to speak is mandatory, and is not subject to the discretion of the court. See U.S. v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1343–45 (D. Utah 2005); see also Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Calif., 435 F.3d 1011, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kenna I); U.S. v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746–50 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 (18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174)

The Act establishes time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution. Government attorneys should comply with the time limits established by the Act. For more information, see the Criminal Resource Manual at 628.) See 18 U.S. Code Chapter 208 – SPEEDY TRIAL | LII / Legal … & 18 U.S. Code § 3161 – Time limits and exclusions | LII … — Shouldn’t the presiding judge also comply with the time limits established by the Act?

“The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was designed to regulate the time in which a trial is to begin, to ensure that criminal prosecutions are not unduly delayed. Generally, the Act requires a trial to begin within 70 days of the filing of information or an indictment or the initial appearance of the defendant. The Act was designed to benefit defendants, but also to prevent extended delays from impairing the deterrent effects of punishment and “… to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials…” (H.R. Rep. No. 93-1021, pp 6–8). However, specific exclusions are delineated in the Act allowing pretrial delays during the 70-day period under certain circumstances. Such circumstances include, but are not limited to: the defendant’s involvement in another proceeding, the unavailability of the defendant, or the mental or physical incompetence of the defendant to stand trial (18 U.S.C.S. §3161(h)(2005)).

The Act also includes a provision that allows courts discretion to make an “ends of justice continuance” to account for limited delays in complicated cases. The Act provides the court with flexibility within certain specific procedural boundaries. After considering certain factors, the court is allowed to grant a continuance if it weighs the need for the continuance against the public’s and defendant’s interests and does so on the record. A list of acceptable reasons is provided in the Act to satisfy the ends of justice threshold and include factors such as the defendant’s need for “reasonable time to obtain counsel,” “continuity of counsel,” and “effective preparation” of counsel (18 U.S.C.S. §3161(h)(8)(B)(iv)(2005)). If the court fails to follow these specific guidelines and the trial fails to begin on time, sanctions are contained in the Act allowing the defendant to move for a dismissal before the start of the trial or entry of a guilty plea. The district court by law must, in those circumstances, dismiss the charges, but has the discretion to dismiss the charges with or without prejudice.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court concluded that a prospective waiver of the application of the Act is not permissible. In its reasoning, the Court looked to the plain language of the Act and to legislative history. The Court held that Congress has explicitly enumerated areas of exclusion in the Act and that there is no provision within these acceptable exclusions that allows the district court discretion to make an “ends of justice continuance” to account for seven years’ delays in sentencing after the jury’s guilty verdict in complicated cases. The omission of this provision was considered by Congress, and thus district court cannot opt out of the Act.

Moreover, the Court emphasized the dual purposes of the Act, not only to protect the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial, but also to protect the “public interest.” To allow the district court the right to waive the Act when the right is not solely held by the defendant or the district court would not protect societal interests, as intended by the Congress. See Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976 (2006).

Rainey’s seven-year delay was ridiculous, illogical, irrational, senseless, thoughtless, unreasonable, and was contrary to the Congressional intent that the Act was designed to benefit defendants, but also to prevent extended delays from impairing the deterrent effects of punishment and “… to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials…”

Furthermore, Rainey did not adequately follow section 3572(b), which directs the district court to impose a fine “only to the extent that such fine . . . will not impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution.” $2 million fine for two counts of Clean Air Act violations is itself insufficient and disproportionate to CITGO’s culpability and reprehensibility of crimes and its assets. Most importantly, the fine did not impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution, but allowed the defendant to get away with the crimes committed. In all conscience, $0 restitution violated the restitution rights of the crime victims, and the best interests of the public.

TWO PRECEDENTS COMPLYING WITH THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

I. The parties filed a joint request to exclude a period of delay for purposes of computing Speedy Trial Act time limits. After noting that a public hearing on this matter would require further notice to the victims, but that a written submission would not, the court allowed the parties to submit a joint written waiver form and then approved the waiver in a written order. See U.S. v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). This opinion contains an extended discussion of many of the CVRA’s provisions, the legislative history, potential problems that courts may face, and actions courts may take in attempting to balance the various interests involved.

II. When the defendant and the prosecutor jointly moved to continue the trial for ninety days, the New Hampshire Democratic Party (NHDP) claimed it was a “victim” under section 3771(e) and filed an objection to the motion, arguing that the continuance would violate the “right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay” under section 3771(a)(7). In light of the rights of the ostensible victims, “and taking into account the court’s statutory obligation to ‘ensure that [all] crime victim[s][are] afforded the rights described,’” the court stated that “the parties are hereby put on notice that no further continuance will be granted in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.” Cf. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (court notes that it allowed the parties to exclude a period of delay in computing the time within which an indictment must have been filed by simply filing with the court a written waiver form signed by counsel for both parties, an action that did not require notice to the victims). See U.S. v. Tobin, No. 04-CR-216-01-SM (D.N.H. July 22, 2005).  

* I bet for the 7-year delay in sentencing, you didn’t have a written waiver form signed by counsel for both parties, did you?  Why? Because you are above the law without having to compute Speedy Trial Act time limits, John?

 

Judge Rainey: We waited for your restitution order for seven years after the jury’s conviction of CITGO’s crimes.

You gave us high expectations, and set us up for disappointment. We are merely a few of the crime victims affected by your $0 restitution order!

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

* Click Images for judge skipper koetter’s corruption, and you will see 12 photos. Click any one of them,  wait awhile, and it will take you to more than 70 images linking to my BLOG. Have these given you sleepless nights, Skipper and John?

COMPARING JOHN DELAY RAINEY WITH THE HONORABLE LEE H. ROSENTHAL AND OTHER JUDGES PRESIDING OVER CVRA CASES

In CVRA cases, most courts resort to Plea Agreement or Settlement to resolve the disputes, why didn’t you, John Delay Rainey?

Your colleague, the Honorable Lee H Rosenthal, whom you seemed to respect so much and kept citing his opinion in your 4/30/2014 MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER disposed of his complex case in less than four years. Why did you spend seven years sentencing?

Did you notice that BP Products had an explosion at the Texas City, Texas plant that killed 15 and injured scores of workers on March 23, 2005, and on March 12, 2009 Judge Lee H Rosenthal rendered his MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, quickly, efficiently, and effectively disposing of the case? That was less than four years including a trip to the 5th Circuit. But Judge Rosenthal’s decision was not reckless, ill-advised, or fast and loose. In the lengthy opinion, he did survey virtually all CVRA cases available then, and analyzed numerous issues involving competing interests.

Judge Rosenthal wrote in part: “The plea agreement stipulates the sentence: a $50 million fine and three years of probation with the conditions that BP Products comply with a Settlement Agreement reached with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and an Agreed Order imposed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”).

“BP Products points out, and the victims have not disputed, that the fine is not the only financial consequence that BP Products will bear as a result of the explosion. In addition to paying over $1.6 billion to the victims to settle approximately 4,000 civil cases, BP Products has also paid almost $21.7 million in fines to OSHA and to the TCEQ and will pay over $265 million to do the work required under the OSHA Settlement Agreement and the TCEQ Agreed Order. (Docket Entry No. 8 at 10-11).

“As a result of inspections of the Texas City facility conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency in the wake of the 2005 explosion, BP Products also recently entered into a civil settlement under which it must implement over $161 million in new pollution controls, pay a $12 million civil penalty, and complete a $6 million supplemental project. This civil settlement addresses pollution control, maintenance and monitoring, and internal management violations at the Texas City facility unrelated to the cause of the 2005 explosion. See Sixth Amendment to Consent Decree, United States v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., No. 2:96-cv-0095 (N.D.Ind. Feb. 19, 2009); Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, BP Products to Pay Nearly $180 Million to Settle Clean Air Violations at Texas City Refinery (Feb. 19, 2009).”

“The issues in this case, one of the few in which the government has successfully applied a felony criminal statute to an industrial accident, present significant risks that absent the plea, the government would not be able to prevail or would only obtain a $500,000 fine. These risks have been considered in weighing the adequacy and reasonableness of the proposed plea terms.

“Considering the specific facts and circumstances presented in this voluminous record, including the victims’ objections, this court finds that the proposed plea is a reasonable disposition given the available alternatives, the risks they present, and the limits inherent in the statutes that the government can use to obtain a felony conviction to punish conduct leading to an industrial accident. Accordingly, this court accepts the proposed plea.” See S.D. Texas, Houston Division. U.S. v. BP Products North …

In comparison, your 4/30/2014 MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER is one-sided, biased, prejudiced, and without taking into consideration of proper punishment and deterrence against CITGO’S future violations and those of the other copy cats. Your $2 million fine for two counts of ten-year ongoing Clean Air Act violations, $45,000 for migratory birds, and $0 restitution for the 800+ qualified crime victims are callous, arbitrary, unreasonable, and disproportionate to the harms done to the crime victims and the environment.

Let’s take a closer look at your own USA v. CITGO Docket 06-563. Shouldn’t you be ashamed of yourself for such incompetency, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in the administration of criminal justice?

08/09/06 Indictment
06/27/07 Jury Conviction
02/05/14 Sentence
04/30/14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER awarding the historical restitution of $0 to the 800+ crime victims.

Examining the Docket Report 06-563 – USA v. CITGO Petroleum Corporation et al, one cannot help being curious to ask you why there was a vacuum or a black hole between December 22, 2007 and March 27, 2011. What were you doing during those three years and nine months at the expense of taxpayers’ money? Sleeping day and night? Vacationing? Taking a sabbatical leave? Travelling around the world? Making a trip to the moon? None of the above would have taken you 45 months. Unless you were in  a coma, you couldn’t have slept 45 months without waking up. Going away on vacation or taking a sabbatical leave generally wouldn’t be more than one year.  David Niven travelled around the world in 80 days. Neil Armstrong only spent 8 days, 14 hours, 12 minutes, and 30 seconds in space. Why are you so special?

Tell us the truth! What were you doing while the crime victims were awaiting your sentencing? The Jury convicted CITGO on 6/27/07. Why did you have to wait for seven years to announce your sentencing? Any trade secrets? Can you blame people for suspecting you of taking a monstrous bribe, less than $1.8 billion? Any reasonable man or woman would be suspicious of your motives in doing what you did. It was reported that CITGO’s executives knew about the $2,045,000 fine and $0 restitution in 2012, two years before your formal announcement. Why? There are so many questions in my mind and in those of any neutral parties about your misconduct. Many say that you deserve being removed, impeached, or forced into overdue retirement. I can’t think of any reason to disagree with them. Can you, John Delay? 

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

* Click Images for judge skipper koetter’s corruption, and you will see 12 photos. Click any one of them,  wait awhile, and it will take you to more than 70 images linking to my BLOG. Have these given you sleepless nights, Skipper and John?

Is that your law clerk? Your procrastination piled up lots of paperwork for her! After 7 years’ delay, you expect her to finish drafting a MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER for each of the 14 delayed cases in a week?

You are very slow, aren’t you, John?

No, I only slow down when I am faced with indigents and minorities, Paul!

Do you intend to divorce yourself from incompetence by cutting off the prefix?

 

 

 You also think of yourself as a man of ability, don’t you, Mr. Delay? 

 

RAINEY’S ROTTEN-TO-THE-CORE FORMULA FOR CORRUPT JUDGES’ MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

If you can sleep on a case of your choice for seven years without feeling guilty, and a TRO Motion for 11.5 months, you are qualified to use my FORMULA. Otherwise, you don’t belong to the ROTTEN-TO-THE-CORE GOLD CLUB! — SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE JOHN DELAY RAINEY — Now, as a case in point, let’s look at USA v. CITGO, ET AL. Who can offer me the following gold bars, crowns and gems? The crime victims or the criminals? The answer is crystal clear! You just need to be cold-hearted like me so that you can be gold-hearted!

 

1. CONCLUSION: DENIAL OF ANY MOTIONS/PRAYERS FOR RELIEF

2. SEARCH FOR ANY CASELAW TO SUPPORT THE PREDETERMINED CONCLUSION.

3. SELECT ANY LAW, STATUTE, OR RULE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

4. DISREGARD ANY CONFLICTING CASELAW, CIVIL/CRIMINAL LAW, STATUTE, RULE, OR CONSTITUTION

Let’s examine Chen v. Cox Document 18 :: Chen v. Cox et al :: 6:2009mc00011 :: Texas … first.　

Court Description:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER… granting 1 Pltf’s Ex Parte Motion for Permission to Continue to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, 16 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis… denying 4 Pltf’s Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restrainin g Order and Preliminary Injunction, 9 Pltf’s Motion Objecting to South Port Alto MUD Petition, 11 Pltf’s Motion to Have All Documents in this Case Sealed, 12 Pltf’s Ex Parte Motion for Removal of Civil Rights Cases from the State Court to the District Court, 13 Pltf’s Ex Parte Motion Suggesting Voluntary Recusal of Judges Under Special Circumstances, and 2 Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for a Court Appointed Attorney… Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a concise compl aint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 within 15 days after the date of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, or any other order of the Court, this action shall be dismissed.(Signed by Judge John D. Rainey) Parties notified.(ltesch, )

Wait for 11.5 months for any TRO Motions. Then, grant a minor Motion as a token of appearance of impartiality, i.e., 1 Pltf’s Ex Parte Motion for Permission to Continue to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

Wait for as long as possible. Litigants may just go away, crawl away, limp away, walk away, run away, bike away, drive away, fly away, fade away, pass away, or be carried away! Away they go, and you are home free!

You have become not only the bad apple but also the rotten apple of the United States judiciary, Rainey.

So you predetermined we should not receive any restitution from CITGO for the pain and suffering inflicted on us since 1994, didn’t you, Judge Rainey?

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen 

* Click Images for judge skipper koetter’s corruption, and you will see 12 photos. Click any one of them,  wait awhile, and it will take you to more than 70 images linking to my BLOG. Have these given you sleepless nights, Skipper and John?

DO YOU KNOW WHY I HAVE TO TAKE YOU DOWN, JOHN DELAY RAINEY?

Your bias, prejudice, discrimination against the indigent minorities are so appalling that they have inflamed my “ETHICAL INDIGNATION!”

Here are the specific reasons why I have to take you down, Mr. Rainey:

1. You made me MAD by sleeping on my rights since the initiation of my lawsuits: a) It took you ten months to grant my April 18, 2005 application to proceed in forma pauperis; b) You dismissed my six Complaints comprising 85+ meritorious claims in V-06-78 without having the Clerk serve process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(d); c) You have never given me a day in court since April 18, 2005 despite my repeated requests for reinstatement under Rule 1-041(E)(2) of Rules Enabling Act; d) You slept on my 2 TRO Motions and others for 11.5 months without taking any action; e) You dismissed all the motions on July 12, 2010 when you were served with subpoena to testify in my Notice of Lis Pendens case (10-6-29); f) You refused to accept the subpoena by pretending to be attending a judicial conference.

2. You made me MADDER for giving CITGO only a small fine of $2 million instead of $2 billion for its ten years’ knowing and willful violations of Clean Air Act.

3. You made me MADDEST for awarding the migratory birds $45,000, but the 800+ crime victims NOTHING. They are poor Mexican Americans living in the polluted neighborhood, having had to breathe the cancer-producing benzene and having been exposed to the other toxic pollutants between 1994 and 2003, when legal actions were initiated. And you know their sufferings more than everyone else. Though you cited so many victims’ illnesses caused by CITGO’s air pollution in your 4/40/1014 ORDER, you heartlessly awarded the crime victims nothing! 

4. You never gave CITGO any punitive damages to punish it for intentional and malicious violations of Clean Air Act and to deter its future violations as well as those of other followers. As a federal judicial officer, you have failed your duty of the administration of justice! Your habit of procrastination and undue delay is despicable and unforgivable!

 

 

 

 

 

Your colleagues and victims are admonishing you, John Delay Rainey!

Unlike many of the federal employees, you have won the Rotten to the Core Academy Award!

 

***

“Don’t do the crime if you can’t do the time.” — Since CITGO can’t do the time, they should have thought twice before intentionally committing the crime. You cannot just let them get away with it. Steep fines, penalties, compensatory and punitive damages in proportion to the criminal defendant’s assets are the price to pay for the ten-year knowing, willful, and malicious criminal acts done by CITGO, a corporate entity that can’t do the time.

 

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen 

* Click Images for judge skipper koetter’s corruption, and you will see 12 photos. Click any one of them,  wait awhile, and it will take you to more than 70 images linking to my BLOG. Have these given you sleepless nights, Skipper and John?

 

 

Rainey Misapplied the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) Instead of Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA)

The intentional misapplication of VWPA instead of MVRA essentially deprived Citgo’s crime victims of the “right to full and timely restitution as provided in law” under the CVRA.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A

U.S. v. Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314 (D. Utah 2004):

This case focused on the issue of lost income awards in homicide cases under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) and the possible effect of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), on the MVRA. The court also noted that the passage of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) reinforced its decision to award lost income, and that legislative history endorsed an “expansive definition of restitution.” Furthermore, the intention of the “right to full and timely restitution as provided in law” under the CVRA “means that existing restitution laws will be more effective.” 

In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC, 409 F.3d 555, 558–64 (2d Cir. 2005) 

This case seems to have been the first appellate decision involving an action brought under the CVRA. A group of victims filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, and demanded that a settlement agreement in a forfeiture action involving a large, complex securities fraud be vacated. The government entered into a proposed settlement agreement and set up a $715 million victim compensation fund. To participate in the fund, victims had to give up separate civil actions. Two groups of victims were against the proposed settlement in that the compensation fund would be inadequate and that their right to “full and timely restitution” under § 3771(a)(6) would be breached. Victims also argued that the government did not adequately consult with them before entering into the settlement agreement pursuant to § 3771(a)(5), and that they were not “treated with fairness,” under § 3771(a)(8).

Finding that in view of the complexity of the case and thousands of potential victims, the settlement was considered a reasonable compromise envisioned by § 3771(d)(2) to avoid “unduly complicat[ing] or prolong[ing] the proceedings,” the district court ruled for the settlement agreement. 

The Appellate Court held that “a district court’s determination under the CVRA should be reviewed for abuse of discretion,” that the relevant law was the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, which specifically allows for less than full restitution in a case with so many victims as to “make restitution impracticable” and complex issues that could “complicate or prolong the sentencing process.”  

The court also held that the CVRA requires the district court to provide victims with an opportunity to be heard concerning a proposed settlement agreement, and that it provided the victims with a full opportunity to do so in this case. 

The court further held that “the district court in no way treated the victims unfairly or without ‘respect for [their] dignity and privacy,’ 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8), but rather considered the factors of numerosity of victims, the uncertainty of recovery, and the prospect of unduly prolonging the sentencing proceedings, which Congress has required the court to consider when adopting the settlement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2), which provides in pertinent part: In a case where the court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings. 

The court finally denied the petition for mandamus.

Comparing the above two cases with Rainey’s $0 restitution in USA v. CITGO makes it clear that Rainey abused discretion, misused his judicial power, and deprived the 800+ crime victims of their “right to full and timely restitution as provided in law” under the CVRA. They could have been allowed for less than full restitution but not to the total denial of any restitution.  Rainey misinterpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2); “the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings” means he must fashion or think of a reasonable procedure to give the victims full and timely restitution that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings.” It does not give him the authority to strip the 800+ victims of the full restitution owed them by the criminal entity, i.e., CITGO. 

* fashion = contrive = form or make (something) in a skillful or clever way = form or think of (a plan, method, etc.) See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fashion.

In response to Section 3771(d)(2) of the CVRA, which provides that in cases involving a large number of victims, “the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings,” the court noted “victims’ rights under the CVRA begin well before a conviction; thus, the status of ‘victim’ may be based on allegations rather than proof.” See U.S. v. Saltsman, No. 07-CR-641 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007). This is a sensible, well-reasoned, well-thought-out answer to Section 3771(d)(2)’s requirement that “the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure” in light of the lapse of time.

Restitution in the criminal arena refers to an affirmative performance by the defendant that benefits either the victim of the crime or the general public. If a victim can be identified, a judge will order the defendant to make restitution to the victim. See TheFreeDictionary. It would be tolerable if the restitution were less than full, but $0 restitution made to the crime victims is irrational, preposterous, off-the-wall!

In reviewing Rainey’s MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER of 4/30/2014, relevant case law, and statutes, I have found numerous flaws in his so-called OPINION, which was a cover your ass design to avoid taking real responsibility for his undue seven-year delay and unprecedented $0 restitution. Both are undoubtedly record-breaking in the history of litigation, be it western or eastern! He deserves to be listed in Guinness World Records for his ultimate record-breaking facts & achievements, albeit disgraceful, reprehensible, and impeachable.

“Much like restitution for medical expenses, the Court would be required to determine issues of fact related to exposure, proximate cause, potential alternative causes, and accurate computation of loss for each item described above, effectively turning each request for restitution into a separate tort case. Moreover, despite the Court’s request to at least identify the type of evidence upon which they would rely to show causation and proof of loss, neither the Government nor the victims making these restitution requests have identified what evidence they would offer to support these requests. The Court finds that the “complication and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of an order of restitution” for the miscellaneous restitution requests set forth above “outweighs the need to provide restitution to any victims,” and that the “magnitude of expected future harm can[not] be reasonably estimated.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii); U.S.S.G. § 8B1.2(b). Accordingly, the Government’s request for a trust fund to cover restitution requests made by victims other than the Community Members is DENIED. 

“On February 5, 2014, the Court sentenced CITGO to a fine of $2,045,000.00—the maximum fine allowed by law—and further stated that because of the complex issues involved with restitution, the Court would issue a written decision on the issue of restitution within 90 days. That decision is set forth herein.” See 06-563 – USA v. CITGO Petroleum Corporation et al.

Rainey unreasonably demanded causation and proof of loss and ignored the mandatory duty that “the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings,” that “the CITGO crime victims’ rights under the CVRA begin well before the June 27, 2007 conviction, i.e., between 1994 and 2003, that victims’ memories may have faded, evidence lost,  people died, etc., and that “the status of ‘victim’ may be based on allegations rather than proof,” a reasonable procedure fashioned in U.S. v. Saltsman. Furthermore, postponing the issue of restitution for 90 days by issuing a written decision without reasonably hearing the victims in person violated CVRA. “The CVRA gives victims the right to speak directly to the judge at sentencing.” The phrase “to be reasonably heard” is ambiguous, but the legislative history “makes it clear that the CVRA created a right to be heard in person.” “The court concluded that a victim’s right to speak is mandatory, and is not subject to the discretion of the court unless such a large number of victims are involved that the court’s ability to function effectively would be threatened.” U.S. v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1343–45 (D. Utah 2005). When a large number of victims are involved, isn’t it reasonable to have some representatives exercise the right to be heard in person by attending the 4/30/2014 rendition of restitution order? Why shut them out completely to hide in the chambers? Shame, cowardice, guilt?

He acted in ways considered unethical and violated his obligations of impartial conduct as a judicial officer. His judicial misconduct includes “conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts; using the judge’s office to obtain special treatment for his favorite defendants, e.g., Citgo, Anita L. Koop, Terry J. Cox, among others. In 2008 some friends of mine, seeing Rainey’s undue delay and no service of process under 28 U.S.C. §1915(d), insisted on my subscribing to ancestry.com to investigate the relationship between the couple of fraud and the corrupt John Delay Rainey. I will certainly do so when I am ready to file a PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS to request that the 5^th Circuit compel him to vacate all the VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS rendered in my civil actions.

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

* Click Images for judge skipper koetter’s corruption, and you will see 12 photos. Click any one of them,  wait awhile, and it will take you to 70+ images linking to my BLOG. Have these given you sleepless nights, Skipper and John?

Rainey Violated Speedy Trial Act, Crime Victims’ Rights Act and the Constitution

The defendants have the right to a speedy trial; the victims have the right to “proceedings free from unreasonable delay.” Normally it is detrimental to the defendants when the trial is prolonged. However, in USA v. Citgo Petroleum Corporation, because of Rainey’s bias, prejudice, discrimination against the low-income, minority crime victims, and partiality, favoritism for the Multi-Billion Dollar Company, the seven-year delay of sentencing, the total denial of restituion for the victims, the violations of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Amendments to the United States Constitution, among others, make the proceedings invalid and all the ORDERS/JUDGMENTS rendered in connection with the case VOID ab initio.

I urge the victims’ counsel and the Government to file a joint or separate PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS to have the Fifth Circuit compel Rainey to vacate all the VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS. Then, file another PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT pursuant to Rule 1-041(E)(2) of Rules Enabling Act, which provides that Plaintiff “may move for reinstatement of the case,” and, “[u]pon good cause shown, the court shall reinstate the case.” Please refer to: PREPARE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WITHOUT A LAWYER Posted on July 16, 2014.

“If a court’s decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void for Rule 60(B) purposes, even if the court had personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995). See [PDF] 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN …. Since he violated the victims’ statutory and constitutional rights, his rulings are all void, null, and without any legal force.

He had presided over the Citgo case without power or jurisdiction since August 9, 2006 when the Government filed its original ten count indictment against CITGO Petroleum Corporation, et al. He has wasted enormous judicial resources and tax payers’ money and is liable civilly and criminally. If I were one of the victims, I would sue him for violations of the victims’ civil rights under Bivens action instead of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents :: 403 U.S ….　

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen