INTRODUCTION
The following seven Orders or Judgments founded upon the 7/2/1996 VOID Trustee’s Deed which had been obtained by the wrongful foreclosure of Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI), a non-existent corporation, were rendered by Judge Koetter without any power, authority or jurisdiction:
- 7/15/10 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
- 7/16/10 DEFAULT JUDGMENT
- 11/30/10 ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS
- 11/30/10 FINAL JUDGMENT
- 4/11/12 ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
- 5/15/13 FINAL ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
- 6/17/14 ORDER OF DISMISSAL
ARGUMENT
- It is the judiciary’s responsibility to promote and provide fair and equal treatment to all parties. Individual judges are charged with the task of adjudicating claims in a manner that protects the rights of both parties. See In re Thomas, 873 S.W.2d 477, 496-97 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994) (citations omitted). Judge Koetter has never taken his responsibility to promote and provide fair and equal treatment to Chen in all the cases before him. He is charged with the task of adjudicating claims in a manner that protects the rights of both parties. But his arbitrary rulings and misconduct demonstrate bias, prejudice, partiality, favoritism, unfairness, and injustice contrary to the task imposed on him.
- In conspiracy with the attorneys involved in these cases, and David Roberts, Esq., Judge Koetter committed fraud on the 10-6-28, 10-6-29, 10-6-13752 & 12-4-1596 Courts by proceeding to hear the cases and making decisions without any power, authority or jurisdiction.
- Chen contends that due process was not accorded him and other interested parties. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction failed in these Koetter courts because Judge Koetter:
1) engaged in unlawful activity, particularly accepting $5,900.10 from one of the Plaintiffs, David Roberts and his law firm, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP. before and after the July 15, 2010 hearing. — Is the $5,900.10 to be regarded as a bribe, a reward or a campaign contribution or all of the above?
2) signed, immediately after the July 15, 2010 hearing, the purported Judicial Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusion drafted and prepared in advance by Plaintiffs’ three seasoned attorneys, Kenneth Burch, Carl Haddard, Richard Morrison, Assistant DA Shannon Salyer, et al. without changing a single word, without glancing at Chen’s pleadings filed on the record, and by giving away his bias, prejudice, discrimination, partiality and favoritism with his obvious body language. “It was patently unfair to the Defendant, who has not had “ample opportunity” to argue for or against the findings.” See In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1987); see also In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1311. (“When an interested party is permitted to draft a judicial order without response by or notice to the opposing side, the temptation to overreach and exaggerate is overwhelming.”) Id. The record shows that the hearing started at 9 a.m. and ended at about 10.00 a.m., that the void JUDICIAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW REGARDING DOCUMENTATION OR INSTRUMENT P[E]RPORTING TO CREATE AS L[EI]N OR CLAIM prepared by Plaintiffs’ attorneys in advance was filed at 10:07 a.m. with Judge Koetter’s signature without considering Chen’s challenges of, inter alia, subject matter jurisdiction filed on the record.
3) did not act impartially and did not even have any appearance of impartiality by allowing the three opposing attorneys to approach the bench, by smilingly signing their prepared Order/Judgment without any change, and by not even glancing at Chen’s Pleadings immediately after the 7/15/10 hearing. See Bracey V Warden, U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997).
4) failed to recuse himself in the proceedings where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned: Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) protects the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary by requiring a judge to recuse in any proceeding where “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “The standard is ‘whether an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.’” In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 144, 455(a) (judge’s “impartiality might be reasonably questioned) and Christo v. Padgett, 233 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)). The judge’s intentions or motivations for engaging in the ex parte communications or acceptance of campaign contribution are irrelevant to the inquiry; rather, the inquiry is an objective one which asks whether the judge’s acceptance of $5,900.10 from the attorney and his law firm that are Plaintiffs in the proceedings before him would raise in the mind of a fully informed lay observer questions regarding his impartiality. The answer to that question here can only be “yes.” Furthermore, Judge Koetter was one of the defendants in Chen’s June 4, 2012 Section 1983 Civil Rights Action, which triggered his constitutional disqualification. See Juergen “Skipper” Koetter: U.S. v. Will says you are engaged in an act of treason! May I call you traitor, then? July 22, 2014 and other posts related to Judge Koetter.
5) did not follow statutory procedure by requiring Plaintiffs to prove existence of subject matter jurisdiction when Chen challenged the court’s lack of it. Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill 140, 143 (1921) (If a court’s decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void), See e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995); Assumed Business or Professional Name Act; 1st & 14th Amendments to the US Constitution; Open Courts Doctrine of Texas Constitution.
6) exceeded his statutory authority, denied Chen’s 1st Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances, deprived Chen of “life, liberty, property” guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, disregarded the Open Courts Doctrine of Texas Constitution, and violated the Assumed Business or Professional Name Act, §71.201 (a) of the Business and Commerce Code and Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code by willfully, erroneously, and maliciously labeling him “a vexatious litigant”, charging him with filing “frivolous” lawsuits and prohibiting him from filing any new petitions in the State of Texas, among others.
7) violated due process in holding the July 15, 2010 hearing by ambush (lack of pretrial discovery thwarted justice, subverted, undermined, and impeded Chen’s fact-finding ability, and unfairly hampered the presentation of his counterclaims and affirmative defenses), and rendering the November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment for the factually and legally non-existent corporation, ARPI, which has had no standing since 6/5/1993 when its Assumed Name Certificate expired without any renewal. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019(193; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936).
8) committed fraud upon the court by acting in manner inconsistent with due process of law and acting unconstitutionally in entering the purported orders and final judgments despite ARPI’s lack of standing, the courts’ lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Attorney Randal W. Hill’s perjury. See In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill, App. 3d 393(1962).
9) committed fraud in the procurement of jurisdiction in conspiracy with Plaintiffs Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, ARPI, David Roberts, and their attorneys, Kenneth Burch, Carl Haddard, Richard Morrison, et al., See Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E. 2d 893 (1985).
10) misinterpreted NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS and was ignorant of the 87+ Texas precedents, e.g., (a) A notice of lis pendens is privileged even if filed in connection with a suit not lawfully supporting the filing. See Prappas v. Meyerland Community Improvement Ass’n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); (b) The lis pendens filing was absolutely privileged, even if there was not statutory basis for the filing. Id. See also Manders v. Manders, 897 F.Supp. 972, 976 (S.D. Tex. 1995); (c) Prappas also concluded that the absolute privilege is not lost if the notice of lis pendens fails to include all required statutory elements. See Id. At 798. (See AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING filed in Case 2010-CR-0234 & Case 2010-CR-0235 on August 31, 2010.)
11) founded the June 15, 2014 ORDER OF DISMISSAL on the VOID November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment without affording Chen an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
CONCLUSION
Tainted by judicial errors, Plaintiffs’ lack of standing, and the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, each of the above seven Orders or Judgments is merely a piece of waste paper, an absolute nullity. See Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). “A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity.” Also, a void judgment has been defined as “one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place directly or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758); City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973); People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994). It has also been held that “It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or[,] collateral.” Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.).
Paul Chen