This is excerpted from the VERIFIED MOTION TO VOID ORDER OF DISMISSAL filed on July 11, 2014, but returned by the Clerk on July 14, 2014, asking Chen to file a motion for leave to file from the District Judge.
That calls to mind the scenario where the catcher also plays the role of an umpire!
Can you imagine the irony of asking one of the Defendants in my $75 million cause of action for permission to file my Motion to Vacate the 6 VOID Orders/Judgments he rendered without jurisdiction, power, or authority?
I. NO ARGUABLE BASIS IN LAW OR IN FACT
1. Having no arguable basis in law or in fact, the June 17, 2014 ORDER OF DISMISSAL is erroneous for the following reasons: ATTACHMENT #A) Please refer to: JUDGE JUERGEN (SKIPPER) KOETTER: My readers were wrong! So was I! Posted on July 15, 2014.
Two Clerical/Administrative/Ministerial: Citing the non-existent Court order of October 5, 2010 and mistaking Salyer the ADA for Hill the lawyer.
Numerous Judicial Errors: Misinterpretation of Frivolousness and Vexatiousness, Order founded upon 11/30/2010 invalid SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Plaintiffs Lacked Standing, Judge Koetter Lacked Jurisdiction, Misapplication of Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code, Fraud upon the Court, Violations of Canons 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, Bribery Statute 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), Open Courts Doctrine of ART. 1 SEC. 13, Art 5 – Sec 1-a of Texas Constitution, the 1st & 14th AMENDMENTS TO THE US CONSTITUTION, SECTION 1983 ACTIONS AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW, Rules 18b(b)(1) & 145 of TRCP, Rendition of over 5 VOID Orders/Judgments, among others.
This Court’s alleged order of October 5, 2010 is non-existent.
Chen has no binding obligation to comply with any VOID Order.
2. “The Court, having reviewed the pleadings filed by Paul Chen, finds that Mr. Chen has not complied with this Court’s order of October 5, 2010 in failing to obtain leave of court prior to filing the pleadings.” No Court order of October 5, 2010 exists in the docket. The entire record shows that no hearing or order involved Chen between July 17 and November 29, 2010. Based in part on the non-existent Court order of October 5, 2010, this ORDER OF DISMISSAL was VOID ab initio. Not until 11/30/2010 did the Court render a summary judgment without Chen’s participation in the hearing where Plaintiffs lacked standing and the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the 11/30/2010 summary judgment was inevitably VOID ab initio. Even if this is considered merely a clerical error, and may be corrected in the open court, the judicial error on standing and jurisdiction was incurable because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as clearly and unambiguously pled in the VERIFIED MOTION TO REOPEN, this VERIFIED AMENDED MOTION TO REOPEN, and Chen’s previous pleadings in the record. “A void judgment does not create any binding obligation. Federal decisions addressing void state court judgments include Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed 370; Ex parte Rowland (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861. Consequently, Chen has no binding obligation to comply with this or any other VOID Order.
3. The ORDER OF DISMISSAL of June 17, 2014 was cc to Shannon Salyer, ADA, who is not Plaintiffs’ counsel on record. This is not a criminal case, and such blunders demonstrate how poorly and carelessly Judge Koetter’s professional competence is maintained! On the COVER page, printed in 14-point Times New Roman font, are the name and address of Plaintiffs’ counsel:
PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL: Randal W. Hill
P.O. Box 1697
Corpus Christi, Texas 78403
Corpus Christi, Texas (Main Office):
802 N. Carancahua, Suite 450
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
4. Clerical mistakes in a judgment may be corrected in open court, and the trial court may render judgment nunc pro tunc according to the truth or justice of the case. Tex. R. Civ. P. 316. Judicial error is error that occurs in the rendering, as opposed to the entering, of a judgment. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 1986). A trial court may only correct by judgment nunc pro tunc entry of a final written judgment that incorrectly states the judgment actually rendered. Id.
5. Citing the non-existent Court order of October 5, 2010 and mistaking Salyer the ADA for Hill the lawyer may be construed as clerical errors to be corrected in open court; finding Chen’s pleadings frivolous founded upon the invalid 11/30/10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT is a callous, capricious, arbitrary, discriminatory judicial error, deliberately indifferent to Chen’s constitutional, statutory, legal and equitable rights. Both clerical mistakes and judicial errors subject the rulings null, void, and without any legal force.
Judicial Error: Misinterpretation of Frivolousness and Vexatiousness
6. “The Court also finds the pleadings are frivolous under Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedy Code.” — This is a judicial error in that Chen has refuted the allegation of frivolousness and vexatiousness in at least two motions filed in the record, i.e., a) Vexatious Litigants and Frivolous Lawsuits: The 61 paragraphs in AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION filed on May 10, 2013 in this case focus on refuting Judge Koetter’s erroneous ruling labeling Chen a vexatious litigant filing frivolous lawsuits. b) See 182-191of VERIFIED AMENDED MOTION TO REOPEN filed on July 11, 2014.
7. Whether Chen’s pleadings are frivolous under Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedy Code is not to be determined by such a conclusory statement without any evidence simply based on a VOID Summary Judgment. Chen’s 64-page, 7,328-word VERIFIED MOTION TO REOPEN is self-evident and self-explanatory. It is meritorious and substantiated by sufficient facts and ample controlling case law, rules, statutes, Texas and US Constitutional Provisions. The submitted MOTION took Chen more than five months, 15 hours per day, seven days a week, based on ten years’ untiring legal research, consuming one laser toner cartridge, and three 500-sheet reams of printing paper (Double-Sided Printing in Safe Toner Mode) after undergoing countless revisions.
Founded upon invalid SUMMARY JUDGMENT, this ORDER is VOID ab initio.
8. The ORDER OF DISMISSAL, founded upon the invalid 11/30/10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT, is VOID ab initio. Besides, it was rendered without hearing the Movant/Affiant or giving him an opportunity to be heard; it is not a judicial determination of his rights. Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.
9. World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980): “A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733 (1878).”
10. “A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its wants of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power to do so exists.” People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448]. “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1Freeman on Judgments, 120c.) An illegal order is forever void.
11. A “void” judgment, as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97 (10/13/58).
12. “Orders issued by a court without jurisdiction are void, and we are under an affirmative duty to vacate void orders without reaching the merits of the issues on appeal.” Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 WL 3202769, at *2 (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b); First American Trust Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co. L.P., 59 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).
13. Tainted by both clerical and judicial errors, this ORDER OF DISMISSAL is merely a piece of waste paper, an absolute nullity. See Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). “A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity.” Also, a void judgment has been defined as “one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at anytime and at any place directly or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758). It has also been held that “It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or, collateral.” Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.).
II. PLEA OF JURISDICTION & SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs Lacked Standing and Judge Koetter Lacked Jurisdiction
14. Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction, any Order or Judgment rendered by Judge Koetter was VOID ab initio! It can be attacked at any time in any proceedings!
Plaintiffs Lacked Standing
15. [A] decision concerning whether a party has standing is not a decision deciding the merits of a case. See Bland Independent School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554. “A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Id. Without subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court must dismiss the case. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 805, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 122 (Tex. 2001). Dismissal is the appropriate disposition when a party lacks standing; it is not a decision on the merits of the case.
16. Whitworth v. Whitworth, NO. 01-04-01026-CV , 222 S.W.3d 616; 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2238, Tex, Ct. App., 1st Dist., Houston, March 16, 2007): Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 S.W.3d at 853; Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, no pet.). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 443 (Tex. 1993) (“TAB”).
17. Standing, as a necessary component of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit under Texas law. Id. at 444; In re C.M.C. & J.T.C., 192 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2006) (orig. proceeding).
18. Standing in Texas state court requires (a) “a real controversy between the parties” that (b) “will be actually determined by the declaration sought.” Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. No real controversy existed between Chen and the Plaintiffs, which would be actually determined by the declaration sought because the latter has never had standing. Therefore, all the challenged Orders/Judgments are VOID ab initio. They may be vacated with Chen’s motions or the court can and must set them aside sua sponte.
19. Confronted with the plea of jurisdiction, this Court has to prove that it has jurisdiction, power or authority to render a VOID Order/Judgment when the Plaintiffs lack standing and the Court has neither subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction. A court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. 2007). Plaintiffs, Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., a defunct corporation, and others, lack standing, and Judge Koetter has no jurisdiction, power or authority to hear the cases.
Judge Koetter Lacked Jurisdiction
20. The ORDER OF DISMISSAL is VOID ab initio because this Court lacked jurisdiction 1) over a party or the property; 2) over the subject matter; 3) to enter a particular judgment; or 4) to act as a court. Jurisdiction could not be conferred by waiver or retroactively[.] See Elna Pfeffer et al. v. Alvin Meissner et al. (11/23/55) 286 S.W.2d 241; Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990).
21. Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case and is never presumed. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443–44. The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 446.
22. In any judicial proceeding, the moving party has the burden of proof of demonstrating that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matters and parties before it. See the following authorities: Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) ; Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U.S. 211 (2002); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization Et. Al., 307 U.S. 496 (59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 36454 L.Ed. 2d 376 (1977); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization Et. Al., 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1979); Cannon v. University Chicago Et. Al., 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Patsy v. Board Regents State Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982); Merrill Lynch v. Curran Et Al., 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (1982); Insurance Corporation Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492, 50 U.S.L.W. 4553 (1982); Matt T. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company America, 128 L.Ed.2d 391, 62 U.S.L.W. 4313 (1994).
23. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to act. See Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 448 n.2 (Tex. 1996). The plaintiff bears the burden to plead facts affirmatively demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d at 642 (Tex. 2007). A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that is intended to defeat a cause of action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regardless of whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).
24. A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge either the pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts. Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-27 (Tex. 2004).
25. When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court must consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W. 3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges jurisdictional facts, we consider the evidence submitted by the parties to address the jurisdictional issues raised. Id. Though Chen’s plea to the jurisdiction challenged jurisdictional facts, the Court never considered the evidence submitted by Chen to address the jurisdictional issues raised.
26. In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, a court may not consider the merits of the case, but only the plaintiff’s pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges plaintiff’s pleadings, the determination pivots on whether the pleader has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Id. We construe pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and look to the pleader’s intent. City of Carrollton v. Singer, 232 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied). When the pleadings neither allege sufficient facts nor demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). Chen’s pleadings both allege sufficient facts and demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is not one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should not be afforded the opportunity to amend. Chen’s pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction; the plea to the jurisdiction must be granted without leave to amend. Id.
27. “If evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.” Id. at 227-28. If evidence had created a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the fact issue should have been resolved by the fact finder. However, the Court merely used a few lines of callous, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, conclusory statements to dismiss Chen’s 64-page, 7,328-word, well-pled VERIFIED MOTION TO REOPEN without giving any reasons. Fact questions, if any, lie in founding the ORDER OF DISMISSAL on the non-existent October 5, 2010 Order, and mistaking the Assistant District Attorney Shannon Salyer for Plaintiffs’ counsel Randal W. Hill, printed in large type on the COVER of Chen’s Motion.
28. “Every court confronted with a law suit of any kind is under both the necessity and the duty of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and it necessarily has jurisdiction to make this determination.” (internal quotations and citations omitted. See Clawson et ux v. Prouty et ux, 215 Ore. 244, 249, 333 P.2d 1104 (1959). Judge Koetter was under both the necessity and the duty of determining whether or not he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit; however, he did nothing. He erroneously presumed that he had jurisdiction despite Plaintiffs’ lack of standing, not knowing “Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 443-44. If a party lacks standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 444; In re C.M.C., 192 S.W.3d at 869. Upon a finding that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the suit. Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
29. “Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action. Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026. The Court’s jurisdiction has been repeatedly challenged by Chen, the court should not have proceeded when it clearly appeared that the court lacked jurisdiction, the court had no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should have dismissed the action.
30. “If it develops in the course of a proceeding that the court does not have jurisdiction in the particular case, any order except one dismissing the proceeding is void.” “The court could do nothing but dismiss the proceeding.” See People v. Shurtleff, 355 Ill. 210, 189 N.E.2d 291 (1933). Judge Koetter continued rendering VOID Orders/Judgments for Plaintiffs despite Chen’s repeated challenges of the court’s jurisdiction resulting from Plaintiff’s lack of standing.
31. Under the Supreme Law of the Land, whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S.200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19U.S.(6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821). Thus, you are qualified to be named traitor of the year.
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Sooner or later, we sell out for money. — Tony Randall
Men make counterfeit money; in many more cases, money makes counterfeit men.— Sydney J. Harris
Men make counterfeit money; in many more cases, money makes corrupt officers of the court, e.g, Juergen “Skipper” Koetter, Kemper Stephen Williams, John D. Rainey, Janis Graham Jack, David Roberts, Randall W. Hill, Richard T. Chapman, and the other attorneys representing Anita L. Koop and Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. since June 6, 1993 when it became legally and factually non-existent. — Paul Chen
Money talks!
TO BE CONTINUED.
Paul Chen
P.S. Some readers contacted me and complained about the lengthy posts. I am sorry, but the two Motions I filed or tried to file consist of 48 pages of VERIFIED MOTION TO VOID ORDER OF DISMISSAL & 64 pages of VERIFIED AMENDED MOTION TO REOPEN. My cases are too complicated to make the pleadings short!
MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments 