Mr. Rainey: Why did you sit on my TRO Motions for 11.5 months without taking any actions while others were issued in an hour with a phone call or in one day?

“All men make mistakes, but a good man yields when he knows his course is wrong, and repairs the evil. The only crime is pride.” ― Sophocles, AntigoneIs Mr. Rainey a good man, who never yields when he knows his course is wrong, and never repairs the evil? — My next post on Rules Enabling Act Rule 1-041(E)(2) and 28 USC § 1915(d) will speak for itself! — Please also refer to: Open Letter to Judge John D. Rainey and Judge Janis Graham Jack of Texas, Addressing and Suing Them as Private Citizens Posted on June 10, 2012. **************************************************************************************************** THIS POST IS TO SHOW THE WORLD YOUR TRUE COLORS or rather your false colors, Mr. John D. Rainey! As far as I am concerned, you are disqualified and are liable for civil damages actions and accountable for your criminal activities, including, but not limited to, TREASON!  I have been fighting for justice and fairness since 2005 when I filed my first independent action in Civil Actions: 6:05-mc-00002 in your court. However, for the past nine years, you have never had the Clerk comply with 28 USC §1915(d) to serve the defendants any summons and my six complaints filed in V-06-78. The Clerk’s duty was mandatory after my application for proceeding in forma pauperis was granted despite 10 months’ delay. Consequently, none of the defendants had ever been before your court for adjudication, and you have been in clear absence of all jurisdiction. You have NEVER had any power or authority to hear and determine the controversies, which have never been presented before you. Thus, you have committed many acts of TREASON! I waited in Days Inn Port Lavaca for the issuance of the TROs for several months, then rented a house in El Campo, and had to suffer from your callous, arbitrary, unreasonable dismissal of all my Motions after 11.5 months’ undue delay. Despite my numerous phone calls and letters to your case manager Ms. Joyce Richards, and pleadings submitted in the record, you never had the Clerk perform his mandatory duty to serve process on Defendants Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop & Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. in case 6:09-mc-11 Chen v. Cox. The latter has been a non-existent corporation since June 6, 1993 when its assumed name certificate expired without renewal. When I sued you in 610-cv-00056 Chen v. Rainey for violations of my legal and equitable rights protected by the US Constitution, and asked you to recuse yourself, you refused to abide by the controlling law; you arbitrarily and unreasonably dismissed all my actions with a single brush. Under such circumstances, your recusal or disqualification was mandatory. See the controlling precedents below: Judges shall disqualify themselves in all proceedings in which: they know that, individually or as a fiduciary, they have an interest in the subject matter in controversy. Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(1) (Vernon Supp.1995). This is one of the constitutional grounds for disqualification which cannot be waived. The Texas Constitution states three circumstances in which a judge is disqualified from sitting in a case. Article V, section 11 states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 11. Two statutes codify this mandate. The Government Code provides, in pertinent part, that a judge is disqualified from sitting in cases in which the judge is interested. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 21.005 (Vernon Supp.1995). Disqualification cannot be waived and can be raised at any time. Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex .1982). As a general rule, a judge who is a party to a suit, even though he or she has not been served with process, may not preside over that case, decide any matters requiring judicial discretion, or approve the minutes of the court. Hawpe v. Smith, 22 Tex. 410 (1858). Article V, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution provides that no judge shall sit in any case wherein he or she may be interested. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 11. Likewise, Rule 18b(1) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the judges shall disqualify themselves in all proceedings in which they have an interest in the subject matter in controversy. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(b). The interest that disqualifies a judge is an interest, however small, which rests on a direct pecuniary or personal interest in the result of the case. Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.1979) (per curiam). If a judge is disqualified, the judge is without jurisdiction to hear the case, and therefore, any judgment rendered is void and a nullity. Buckholts Indep. School Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1982); Gulf Mar. Warehouse Co. v. Towers, 858 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Ater, 845 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).In comparison with one-hour phone approval of Looper v. Morgan, Judge Rainey’s 11.5-month delay and inaction of the two urgent TRO Motions I filed on July 31, 2009 was impermissible violation of my due process and equal protection under the 5th Amendemnt. Besides, in my Civil Actions: 6:05-mc-00002 and V-06-78, 6:09-mc-11, and 610-cv-00056 Chen v. Rainey, the Clerk violated 28 USC Sec. 1915(d) without serving process. Thus, the courts had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine the causes of action.  Remember: whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. See U.S. v. Will. The record shows that in Looper v. Morgan, Civ. No. H-92-0294, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10241, (S.D. Tex. June 23, 1995), on January 24, 1992, Judge Rainey’s Court received a telephone call from Looper’s attorneys seeking an order restraining a customs search at the airport. — The Court immediately issued a temporary restraining order directing Morgan to seal the documents and deliver them to the United States Marshal, who would transport them to the Court. (Dkt. #2). The Court later the same day ordered the record of this case sealed. (Dkt. #6).” It can be sealed for no more than ten days until the injunction hearing, not for almost a year without any action like my 2 urgent TRO Motions. If this is not discrimination, what is?      You are biased, prejudiced, unfair, and racially discriminatory! You have no sympathy for the underdogs, and let them down! Furthermore, in Heartbrand Beef, Inc. v. Lobel’s of New York, LLC et al, a COMPLAINT was filed on July 25, 2008, and on July 30, 2008 Judge Rainey rendered an ORDER for Initial Pretrial and Scheduling Conference and Order to Disclose Interested Persons. For the 30 TRO MOTIONS submitted in the record of the case 6:09-mc-11 Chen v. Cox, please click the attachment link. 30 cited cases show that in Case Nos. 1-12, the TRO Motions were issued on the same day they were filed. SUMMARY OF THE 30 TRO MOTIONS AND ISSUANCES Case Nos. 1-12 SAME DAY (TRO Motion to Issuance) Case Nos. 13-19 1-2 DAYS (TRO Motion to Issuance) Case Nos. 20-22 3-4 DAYS (TRO Motion to Issuance) Case Nos. 23-26 5 DAYS (TRO Motion to Issuance) Case Nos. 27-28 6 DAYS (TRO Motion to Issuance) Case No. 29 7 DAYS (TRO Motion to Issuance) Case No. 30 21 DAYS (TRO, Preliminary Injunction, Consent Decree, Final Judgment) ****************************************************************************************** Gold TRUTH is absolutely heavier than gray LIES!   “Live so that when your children think of fairness and integrity, they think of you.” — H. Jackson Brown, Jr. quotes (American best selling writer, author of Life’s Little Instruction Book) Mr. Rainey: When your children think of you, I think, they will think of unfairness and the opposite of integrity, deceit, dishonesty, corruption, dishonor, TREASON!

 of TREASON!

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Paul Chen

P.S. I just visited THE ROBIN ROOM, and found three comments of interest to share with you all here:

Hon. John D. Rainey	See Rating Details
District Judge	See Comments
S.D.Tex.

 

Comment #: 20631: Stood in front of the judge and takes cases personally: manifest injustice experienced from his erroneous, malicious rulings which were in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, various Federal Statutes, and the First and Fifth Amendments to the United State Constitution. Specifically, the litigants were deprived of their constitutionally protected rights to access the court for redress of grievances, due process, equal protection, among others. I agree he is tired of his job, and it shows but I ask should the public pay for that. I just ask be fair to the people that look up to the position you have as the judge which should follow the law just as any law abiding citizen.     Comment #: 18544: Manifest injustice experienced from his erroneous, malicious rulings which were in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, various Federal Statutes, and the First and Fifth Amendments to the United State Constitution. Specifically, the litigants were deprived of their constitutionally protected rights to access the court for redress of grievances, due process, equal protection, among others.

Comment #: 13308: Biased, prejudiced, inexcusable delays, unfair, unjust, unconscionable, ignorant of or indifferent to litigants’ constitutional rights. The worst judge I have ever encountered in my life!

 

Comment #: 20631: I agree he is tired of his job, and it shows!

 

So these are the cases that have remained dormant in your docket for years without service of process!

You’ve indeed accumulated a large backlog over the last ten years!

And you are in the habit of clearing the crowded docket by wholesale dismissals of all the pro se litigants’ complaints whether they have been granted to proceed in forma pauperis before!

 

 

 

Koetter, the worst judge in Texas, second only to Rainey, the most corrupt federal judge!

 

 

 

Judge Janis Graham Jack is even worse!

Koetter = Juergen “Skipper” Koetter

Rainey = John D. Rainey Sorry, Mr. Rainey. You may have become the scapegoat for your buddy in Texas. It has just come to my notice that you seem to live in South Carolina, and that you are not a corrupt federal judge in southern Texas. But I cannot find any photo of this No. 1 bad federal judge. Unless you object to my posting your picture here, I will regard these as John D. Rainey for the time being until a replacement is available. I don’t believe Judge Rainey has the guts to post his picture online for all the people to see his real traitor’s face! Based on facts: court papers in the record of each and every case and law: case law, statutes, rules, regulations, and the U.S. Constitution, I label him traitor because he committed an act or acts of treason. Let’s see how he is to be punished in the court of law where he shall be removed for cause if not impeached!

Mr. Rainey, you are guilty of treason. As a senior judge, don’t you know that rendering orders in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction is treason?

Why do you say that, your honor?

U.S. v. Will held:

Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of  the United States, wars against that Constitution and engages in  violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he is without jurisdiction, and he/she has  engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will; Cohens v. Virginia.

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In my Civil Actions: 6:05-mc-00002 and V-06-78, 6:09-mc-11, and 610-cv-00056 Chen v. Rainey, the Clerk violated 28 USC Sec. 1915(d) without serving process. Thus, the courts had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine the causes of action.  Remember: whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. See U.S. v. Will.

“You have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.”  See Cohen v. Virginia; U.S. v. Will.

And the actor of treason is named traitor, isn’t it, Mr. Rainey? Therefore, Koetter is called a traitor. Neither you nor Janis Graham Jack can escape from sharing this good name! Why Jack? Because she presided over 610-cv-00056 Chen v. Rainey without jurisdiction. The Clerk never served the Defendant, you, any process, and her court had neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction! That’s why she also falls into the trap, and is subject to the criminal prosecution of TREASON besides my civil damages claims.

Like you, she is merely a private citizen sued in her personal capacity for deprivation of my statutory and constitutional rights!

  Is that you, Janis? You must have lost at least 50 pounds compared with your weight at the 2-minute hearing on 9/22/2010.

There was a Pretrial Conference scheduled at Corpus Christi at 1 p.m. on September 22, 2010 for 610-cv-00056 Chen v. Rainey. But you moved it to your lunch break and in 2 minutes, you had the case thrown out without the Defendant John D. Rainey’s appearance though he was holding court across the hall!

What a farce! Are you above the law, mean, spiteful, hateful, biased Janis?  Do you know I had to spend $500+ flying Continental from Omaha to Corpus? And you threw me out of court in 2 minutes without the Clerk serving process on the parties in interest, especially Defendant John D. Rainey, pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 1915(d).

You cannot make any ruling without strict compliance with well-established and clearly defined laws and procedures. You are not above the law, and as a public official you may not act arbitrarily or unilaterally outside the law.  You made a mockery of the rule of law. The purported 2-minute lunchtime Pretrial Conference was a mockery, a travesty of justice. You knew beforehand that you would not have to hear my argument, which has a sound basis in fact and in law, and that two minutes at most four would be sufficient to have a meritorious claim blindly thrown out of your lunch table.

It is a great misfortune for the law-abiding citizens not to have you impeached and removed from office a long time ago!

I just reviewed Robing Room Ratings and Comments, and am surprised that you are superior to Koetter and Rainey because you are rated the worst federal judge around, perhaps in history!!! Good for you!

Civil Litigation – Private Comment #: 18847
Rating:1.5
Comments:

Why did litigants say you are mean, spiteful, hateful, biased? And I have not seen you for the past three months! Vacation?
Without a doubt the worst federal judge around, perhaps in history. Mean, spiteful, hateful, biased. Has fired/destroyed literally dozens of her law clerks, and seems to enjoy it in a sick sociopathic way. On vacation most of the year also.
Send e-mail to this poster 10/22/2012 2:57:24 PM See AN OPEN LETTER TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE MEMBERS URGING JANIS GRAHAM JACK IMPEACHMENT Posted on November 10, 2012.

Hangman: Are you ready, Mr. Traitor! My ax is ready!

  

It’s awful, isn’t it, Mr. Axman?

That’s the execution of traitors in the olden days!

 TODAY’S LETHAL INJECTION EXECUTION

Convicted murderer Richard Cobb stared into the face of the Texas prison warden who attended his execution Thursday night and told him that the lethal drugs just injected into his body were “awesome.”  See Last Words: Texas Con Calls Lethal Injection ‘Awesome‘ – ABC News.

Images for lethal injection

Mr. Rainey’s wrongdoings have been reported in several posts over the past two years. See Open Letter to Judge John D. Rainey and Judge Janis Graham Jack of Texas, Addressing and Suing Them as Private Citizens Posted on June 10, 2012; An Open Letter to Judges John D. Rainey and Janis Graham Jack charging them with abuse and misuse of judicial power, trespassing, usurpation, conspiracy, corruption, and treason! Posted on June 8, 2012; Abuse and Misuse of Judicial Power, Trespassing, Usurpation, Conspiracy, Corruption, Treason, and RICO Posted on September 26, 2012; How to Justifiably & Reasonably Charge the Officers of the Court with Abuse and Misuse of Judicial Power, Trespassing, Usurpation, Conspiracy, Corruption, Treason, and Racketeering? Posted on November 19, 2012; MOTION TO VACATE THE FINAL JUDGMENT, REINSTATE THE CASE and COMPLAINT AGAINST DEPRIVATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS (revised) Posted on March 25, 2013; PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE SIX COMPLAINTS FILED IN V-06-78 Posted on April 17, 2012; PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE SIX COMPLAINTS  Posted on April 22, 2012 & others.

Because you committed abuse and misuse of judicial power, trespassing, usurpation, conspiracy, corruption, and treason, you are naturally called an abuser and misuser of judicial power, trespasser, usurper, conspirator, corrupter, and traitor. You seem to have been honored with quite a few new titles, your dishonor!

If you preside over your own treason case, how many years shall you or must you sentence the traitor-yourself to prison?  For treason alone, what will be the mandatory minimum penalties or how much time you will be facing, Mr. Rainey?

Do you believe the DA would allow you to sit on the bench and render an order and a judgment in favor of yourself against the United States? Can you repeat what you did to me in this TREASON case where you are again the Defendant and the presiding judge at the same time? Don’t you think any reasonable man would regard this as ridiculous, egregious, outrageous, flagrant, preposterous misconduct?

You can let go of the gavel now! You are not trying to play the role of the prison judge in John Grisham’s Brethren, are you?

 Upon completing Koetter’s case, I’ll continue to report your non-performance of your non-judicial, non-adjudicatory, ministerial, administrative duties, which do not entitle you to absolute, judicial immunity.

At best, you have qualified immunity. However, you have not performed discretionary functions which are shielded from liability for civil damages. Instead, your conduct violated my clearly established statutory and constitutional rights of which a reasonable judicial officer in your position would have known. Consequently, you are neither immune from civil actions nor from criminal prosecutions.

  If you could sit on my two TRO Motions for 11.5 months without doing anything, no wonder your file cabinet is filled with so many stale cases, Mr. Rainey!

So these are the cases that have remained dormant in your docket for years without service of process!

You’ve indeed accumulated a large backlog over the last ten years!

And you are in the habit of clearing the crowded docket by wholesale dismissals of all the pro se litigants’ complaints whether they were granted to proceed in forma pauperis before!

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Paul  Chen

 

Don’t cover your face!

Are you hiding your identity from shame, your honor?

 

Underdog fighting tooth and nail against repression and injustice!

 

 

 

Judge Koetter Rendered 6 VOID Orders/Judgments without Jurisdiction or Due Process.

I accuse Judge Skipper Koetter of Abuse/Misuse of Judicial Power, Trespassing, Usurpation, Conspiracy, Corruption, Treason & RICO. Complete Silence? Posted on July 26, 2014. Please click the above link to view my new post, which was published at ricofraudonthecourt.com by mistake! It was meant for this BLOG! 

Corruption: “Power does not corrupt. Fear corrupts… perhaps the fear of a loss of power.”  ― John Steinbeck

Saint Augustine: “Punishment is justice for the unjust.”

Your honor, would you like to count the money? By the way, my boss sends his regards!

But men are so full of greed today, they’ll sell anything for a little piece of money. — Little Richard   But the briefcase is filled with so many $100 bills that you cannot call it a little piece of money, Little Richard!

You may have the crushing judicial power usurped without jurisdiction and authority, you may be as big as Goliath, but I am as strong as David!

Not David Roberts, your accomplice, though.

David and Goliath by  Michelangelo

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“I play to win and if it looks like I’ve lost, it’s only because it’s not over yet.” ― Kiera Dellacroix, Engravings of Wraith

I litigate to win and if it looks like I’ve lost every case, it’s only because it’s not over yet.   ― Paul Chen

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I. The 6 VOID Orders/Judgments were Rendered without Jurisdiction, Power or Authority, or inconsistent with Due Process.

1. It is the judiciary’s responsibility to promote and provide fair and equal treatment to all parties. Individual judges are charged with the task of adjudicating claims in a manner that protects the rights of both parties. See In re Thomas, 873 S.W.2d 477, 496-97 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994) (citations omitted). Judge Koetter has never taken his responsibility to promote and provide fair and equal treatment to Chen in all the cases before him. He is charged with the task of adjudicating claims in a manner that protects the rights of both parties. But his arbitrary rulings and misconduct demonstrate bias, prejudice, partiality, favoritism, unfairness, and injustice contrary to the task imposed on him.
2. In conspiracy with the attorneys involved in these cases, Plaintiffs’ attorneys, e.g., Randall W. Hill, et al., and David Roberts, Esq., Judge Koetter committed fraud on the 10-6-28, 10-6-29, 10-6-13752 & 12-4-1596 Courts by proceeding to hear the cases and making decisions without any power, authority or jurisdiction.
3. Chen contends that due process was not accorded him and other interested parties in Causes Nos. 10-6-28, 10-6-29, 10-6-13752 & 12-4-1596. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction failed in these Koetter courts because Judge Koetter

1) did not follow statutory procedure by requiring Plaintiffs to prove existence of subject matter jurisdiction when Chen challenged the court’s lack of it. Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill 140, 143 (1921) (If a court’s decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void), See, e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995).

2) did not act impartially and did not even have any appearance of impartiality by allowing the three opposing attorneys to approach the bench, by smilingly signing their prepared Order/Judgment without any change, and by not even glancing at Chen’s Pleadings. See Bracey V Warden, U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997).

3) violated due process in holding the July 15, 2010 hearing by ambush (lack of pretrial discovery thwarted justice, subverted, undermined, and impeded Chen’s fact-finding ability, and unfairly hampered the presentation of his counterclaims and affirmative defenses) and rendering the November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment for the factually and legally non-existent corporation, Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., in conspiracy with Plaintiffs Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and their attorneys, Kenneth Burch, Carl Haddard, Richard Morrison, et al., See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019(193; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936).

4) committed fraud upon the court by acting in manner inconsistent with due process of law and acting unconstitutionally in entering the purported orders and final judgments. See In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill, App. 3d 393(1962). For Skipper Koetter and Randall W. Hill’s conspiracy to commit fraud on the court, please refer to: WARNINGS TO RANDAL W. HILL, ESQ.: YOU VIOLATED TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT!Posted on September 24, 2013; RANDY HILL COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH JUDGE SKIPPER KOETTER, ANITA L. KOOP + TEXAS GANG Posted on May 17, 2013 & RANDALL W. HILL’S PERJURY & SUMMARY JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH SKIPPER KOETTER Posted on May 18, 2013 for further information.

5) exceeded his statutory authority, unlawfully denied Chen’s 1st Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances, deprived Chen of “life, liberty, property” guaranteed by the 14^th Amendment to the US Constitution, disregarded the Open Courts Doctrine of Texas Constitution, and violated Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code by willfully, erroneously, and maliciously labeling him “a vexatious litigant”, charging him with filing “frivolous” lawsuits and prohibiting him from filing any new petitions in the State of Texas, among others; the ORDER OF DISMISSAL of June 15, 2014 was founded on the VOID Summary Judgment of November 30, 2010 without affording Chen an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

6) committed fraud in the procurement of jurisdiction in conspiracy with Plaintiffs Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., David Roberts, and their attorneys, Kenneth Burch, Carl Haddard, Richard Morrison, et al., See Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E. 2d 893 (1985). Plaintiffs having no standing, Judge Koetter had no subject matter jurisdiction. See II. Judge Koetter Engaged in an Act or Acts of Treason for Rendering the VOID Orders/Judgments  below.

7) immediately after the July 15, 2010 hearing, signed the purported Judicial Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusion drafted and prepared in advance by Plaintiffs’ three seasoned attorneys, Kenneth Burch, Carl Haddard, Richard Morrison, Assistant DA Shannon Salyer, et al. without changing a single word, without glancing at Chen’s pleadings filed on the record, and by giving away his bias, prejudice, discrimination, partiality and favoritism with his obvious body language. “It was patently unfair to the Defendant, who has not had “ample opportunity” to argue for or against the findings.” See In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1987); see also In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1311. (“When an interested party is permitted to draft a judicial order without response by or notice to the opposing side, the temptation to overreach and exaggerate is overwhelming.”) Id. The record shows that the hearing started at 9 a.m. and ended at about 10.00 a.m., that the void JUDICIAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW REGARDING DOCUMENTATION OR INSTRUMENT P[E]RPORTING TO CREATE AS L[EI]N OR CLAIM prepared by Plaintiffs’ attorneys in advance was filed at 10:07 a.m. with Judge Koetter’s signature without considering Chen’s challenges of, inter alia, jurisdiction filed on the record.

8) engaged in unlawful activity, particularly accepting $5,900.10 from one of the Plaintiffs, David Roberts and his law firm, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP. — Is the $5,900.10 to be regarded as a bribe, a reward or a campaign contribution or all of the above? Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) protects the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary by requiring a judge to recuse in any proceeding where “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “The standard is ‘whether an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.’” In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 144, 455(a) (judge’s “impartiality might be reasonably questioned) and Christo v. Padgett, 233 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)). The judge’s intentions or motivations for engaging in the ex parte communications or acceptance of campaign contribution are irrelevant to the inquiry; rather, the inquiry is an objective one which asks whether the judge’s acceptance of $5,900.10 from the attorney and his law firm that are Plaintiffs in the proceedings before him would raise in the mind of a fully informed lay observer questions regarding his impartiality. The answer to that question here can only be “yes.” Furthermore, Judge Koetter was one of the defendants in Chen’s Section 1983 Civil Rights Action filed on June 4, 2012.

How much did the winners bribe to beat these poor guys with such meritorious claims like mine?

9) misinterpreted NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS and was ignorant of the 87+ Texas precedents, e.g., (a) A notice of lis pendens is privileged even if filed in connection with a suit not lawfully supporting the filing. See Prappas v. Meyerland Community Improvement Ass’n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. App. – Houston [14^th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); (b) The lis pendens filing was absolutely privileged, even if there was not statutory basis for the filing. Id. See also Manders v. Manders, 897 F.Supp. 972, 976 (S.D. Tex. 1995); (c) Prappas also concluded that the absolute privilege is not lost if the notice of lis pendens fails to include all required statutory elements. See Id. At 798. (See AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING filed in Case 2010-CR-0234 & Case 2010-CR-0235 on August 31, 2010.) (EXHIBITS #5B 6B 7B 8B  EXCERPTS 9-95 in  PP 15-21 of VERIFIED MOTION TO VOID ORDER OF DISMISSAL filed on July 11, 2014 but returned by the Clerk in violation of Rule 145.) 

II. Judge Koetter Engaged in an Act or Acts of Treason for Rendering the VOID Orders/Judgments.

1. Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of  the United States, wars against that Constitution and engages in  violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. If a judge does not fully  comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he is without jurisdiction, and he/she has  engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will; Cohens v. Virginia.

2. When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326.

Does it hurt? Is the price for taking bribes too high for you, your honor?  

Don’t worry, your honor! My rich uncle and his partners have retained two teams of top litigators, criminal and civil, to represent you!

To all the corrupt officers of the court:

When you are in orange jumpsuit like this one, you’ll need both criminal and civil defense lawyers! They don’t come cheap. Save some money for the rainy days!

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The first and greatest punishment of the sinner is the conscience of sin. — Lucius Annaeus Seneca

I just wonder if you have any conscience at all, my dear conspirators and co-conspirators! I am in fact grateful that your egregious misconduct and flagrant miscarriage of justice made it possible for me to ridicule and punish you all online to my heart’s content!  Especially you, Mr. Koetter! You have repeatedly made mockeries of justice by rendering six VOID Orders/Judgments in the clear absence of jurisdiction!

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TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

Please click: JUDGE JOHN D. RAINEY: WHY CHEN V. TERRY COX, ANITA KOOP & ANITA’S RESORT PROPERTIES, INC. TOOK 10.5 MONTHS WITHOUT A TRO OR HEARING WHILE Looper v. Morgan TOOK THE ATTORNEY ONE PHONE CALL TO HAVE YOU ISSUE A TRO? Posted on October 17, 2012. I just revised it with seven more eye-catching pictures for your reading pleasure!

ENJOY, HAVE FUN AND HAVE A GREAT DAY OR NIGHT WHEREVER YOU ARE!

 

 

Google Judge Juergen Skipper Koetter, click any of the 6 pics, Visit page & you’ll be in my BLOG!

I am quite excited about the efficient and effective link of WordPress to Google. The moment I click PUBLISH, the post immediately shows up at Google.com. Last night I cheerfully spent four hours copying, pasting, and editing the following pictures provided by Dreamtime to revise BRIBE, REWARD, GIFT UNDER THE GUISE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS?! posted on July 18, 2014:

The Bribery Statute says that the briber and the bribee shall be equally imprisoned for 2 to 20 years.

 

 He is not stupid; he runs like hell because he knows: “Hell is empty and all the devils are here.” — William Shakespeare

No!

Not enough? I’ll get more tax-free money, your honor, as long as you rule in favor of my boss!

  

                                                                             JUSTICE IS BLIND!

Is $5,900.10 a large campaign contribution and a bribe? Well, it exceeded the ceiling of $5,200 anyway!

An offense under this section of the Texas Bribery Statute is a felony of the second degree, which means 2 to 20 years in prison. And the amount is “anything of value.”

So bribers and bribees be ready for the handcuffs! As long as JUSTICE IS BLIND, you shall face the music one of these days!

I’ll continue to expose all your dark sides concealed in the court papers because of your conspiracy, fraudulent concealment and obstruction of justice, conspirators and co-conspirators! 

A social life like this is waiting for the conspirators and co-conspirators! 

 

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

juergen “skipper” koetter: I’m not a vexatious litigant, but you are a traitor!

May the global court of public opinion render a verdict!

I have been and will continue to post all the legal papers filed in the past nine years.

Mr. Koetter: I’m not a vexatious litigant, See AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION;   but you are a traitor! See Juergen “Skipper” Koetter: U.S. v. Will says you are engaged in an act of treason! May I call you traitor, then? published on July 22, 2014.

I am calling him Mr. Koetter because, being one of the defendants I have sued in the Civil Rights action: AMENDED Cover Letter + PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 posted on May 23, 2013, he has been disqualified as a judge, and all his orders and judgments are VOID, NULL AND WITHOUT ANY LEGAL FORCE. He is just like my neighbor, a private citizen, as far as I am concerned. All my allegations have sound basis in fact and in law. Otherwise, the 450+ posts I have published at ricofraudonthecourt.com since 4/12/2012 would have become the basis for him to sue me for defamation. How would he have remained silent despite my fierce attacks? Look! Can you hear what they are talking about?

See you on Saturday at 7, then. Yes, your honor. I appreciate the opportunity of joining the bridge club!************************************************************************************

Mr. Koetter: I publicly challenge you to answer all my accusations against you in all the posts published and to be published!

I am not familiar with how a traitor in the United States today should be treated. At least, I think an arrest would not be a false arrest, and incarceration would not be wrongful imprisonment, and a trial would not be malicious prosecution as they had done to me though the two criminal charges against my filing NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS and refusing to release them were dismissed favorable to me after delaying two years without any hearing.

 

 I’ll see you end up like this one of this days, Mr. Koetter!

 

 

 

 

Sorry I don’t have enough cash, your honor.

Here’s a gold bar to thank you for ruling in favor of my clients!

Muchas gracias!

 

 

 

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

Juergen “Skipper” Koetter: U.S. v. Will says you are engaged in an act of treason! May I call you traitor, then?

 

Like A. Schwarzenegger, you and all the other officers of the court,

e.g., judges, attorneys, et al., had to take an oath before taking office.

 

Under the Supreme Law of the Land, whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v. Will; Cohens v. Virginia.

“We (judges) have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.” Cohen v. Virginia; U.S. v. Will.

Oaths of Office taken by Judges Koetter, Williams, et al. make it treason to violate 1st, 14th Amendments to the US Constitution and the provisions of Texas Constitution.

Being a traitor, do you know that your judicial immunity is lost, and that you are not only liable in civil actions but also subject to criminal charges? You are no higher than a civilian like me, Mr. Koetter. Neither are you, Mr. Williams! See  Judge Kemper Stephen Williams Had No Jurisdiction Anyway! Posted on November 19, 2013.

 

                                                                 OATH OF OFFICE

1. In Texas as elsewhere, Judges take an Oath of Office, swearing to
support the Constitution of the United States as well as the State of Texas Constitution:
“I swear that I will administer justice without respect to person and do equal rights to the poor and the rich and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me as judge of the superior courts of this state, according to the best of my ability and understanding, and agreeably to the laws and Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States. So help me God.” O.C.G.A. § 15-6-6;
Note: The federal constitution requires that the judicial officers of the state be bound by oath or affirmation to support the federal constitution. See U.S. Const., Art. 6, § 3.

Like the serious judge below, each officer of the court has to take the Oath of Office before undertaking the duties of his/her office. You, Mr. Koetter, and the other judges and attorneys took the Oath of Office with a statement of loyalty to the Constitution of Texas and that of the U.S.  Betraying a sworn oath of office, you committed an act of treason or a high crime.

2. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “No state legislator or
executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without
violating his undertaking to support it.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958).

3. Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of
the United States, wars against that Constitution and engages in
violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. If a judge does not fully
comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer,
124 U.S. 200 (1888), he is without jurisdiction, and he/she has
engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will; Cohens v. Virginia.

4. When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326.

5. A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts. Davisv. Burris, 51Ariz.220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)
6. Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception being for acts done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F2d 59 (C.A.Ariz.1974)

7. There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign. Cooper v. O’Conner, 99 F.2d 133

8. When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction. Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697.

9. “We (judges) have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.” [Cohen v. Virginia, (1821), 6 Wheat. 264 and U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200] treason

10. A Judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484U.S.at 227-229, 108 S.Ct. at 544-545; Stump v. Sparkman, 435U.S.at 380, 98 S.Ct. at 1106. Mireles v.Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991).

11. Administrative-capacity torts by a judge do not involve the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights,” and therefore do not have the judicial immunity of judicial acts. See: Forrester v. White, 484U.S. 219, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 at 1454, (9th Cir. 1993).

12. Absolute immunity does not apply when a judge acts “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356 (internal citations omitted).

13. Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994, 158 F.R.D. 278.

14. A complaint is actionable against Judges under Title 42 U.S.C. 1985 (3), whose immunity does not extend to conspiracy under color of law. Section 1985(3) reaches both conspiracies under color of law and conspiracies effectuated through purely private conduct.

15. Due process and equal protection clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments and the 1st Amendment do prohibit a State or the United States from denying access to its courts to individuals who seek adjudication to redress their grievances. “In either case [Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 or Douglas], the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent.” Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 355.

16. f the court has in some way denied access to court or denied due process, the court cannot proceed, it has lost jurisdiction.

17. 1st Amendment right to petition the courts for the redress of grievances and Texas Constitution’s Open Courts Doctrine succeed as a matter of law with a showing that Chen’s ability to file the underlying lawsuits was delayed or blocked altogether as a result of Judge Koetter’s renditions of six VOID Orders since July 15, 2010, which were all  without due process, without subject matter jurisdiction, without reference to guiding rules and principles and were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

If you don’t close your eyes and focus on good or bad, right or wrong, guilty or not guilty, how can your rulings be fair and just?

18. In Johnson v. Avery the Supreme Court held that prisoners’ access to the courts “may not be denied or obstructed.”7 393U.S.483, 485 (1969). Neither may this indigent pro se Plaintiff’s access to the courts be denied or obstructed.
19. In Bounds v. Smith the Court held that prison authorities have an “affirmative obligation[ ]” to assure prisoners “meaningful access to the courts.” 430U.S.at 824. Here, the presiding judge has an “affirmative obligation[ ]” to assure this indigent pro se Plaintiff “meaningful access to the courts.”  Any reasonable person can see that the 7/15/2010 court appearance cannot qualify for “meaningful access to the courts.”
20. Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation. Bounds v. Smith 430U.S.at 825–26.
21. In this case, unless proof of liability and damages are determined in an adversary proceeding with full opportunity to Chen to participate, an action on a judgment obtained against him is to be precluded. “No judge can conceive of Chen being held liable on a judgment rendered in a case in which he did not participate fully and as an adversary.” See Grundy County v. Dyer, 546 S.W.2d 577.

22.  “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978);United Statesv. Lee, 106U.S.at 220, 1 S.Ct. at 261 (1882).
M.  in pertinent part:
23. Article VI. Clause 2: This Constitution, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Country notwithstanding.
24. Article VI. Clause 3: The judicial Officers, both of the United Statesand of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution…
25. Amendment XIV Section 3 of the United States Constitution provides: No person shall hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as an officer of the United States, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given any aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.
 Insurrection: an act or instance of revolting against civil authority or an established government, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010:
 Rebellion: Open resistance or opposition to an authority or tradition, Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Ed. West Group, pg. 1273
26. Violation of Oath of Office is not only grounds for void judgment, but more importantly, is grounds for impeachment, forever barring holding of Judicial Office.
27. [Under the Supreme Law of the Land, whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason.U.S.v. Will, 449U.S.200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19U.S.(6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
28. “A disqualified judge can take no judicial action in the case and any attempt at such action is a mere nullity.”Garland v. State ofGa., 110Ga.App. 756 (140 SE2d 46) (1964). Having been disqualified, Judge Koetter could take no judicial action in the case and any attempt of his at such action is a mere nullity. Neither could Judge Williams.
29. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
30. “The courts are not bound by an officer’s interpretation of the law under which he presumes to act.” Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92Okla32, 227 F 417.
44. “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.) An illegal order is forever void.

                                                                    Treason 

Under the Supreme Law of the Land, whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v. Will; Cohens v. Virginia.

Blind Lady Justice holding scale and sword. 

In the olden days, the bloody scene was the end of TREASON. What’s the punishment of a TRAITOR today, Mr. Koetter & Mr. Williams?

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

Can Judge Juergen Slipper Koetter Pass the Three-prong Test?

                                                            CAUSE NO. 12-4-1596

AMENDED DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

AMENDED DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFF’S COUNTERCLAIMS AND AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF

In CAUSE NO. 12-4-1596, I repeatedly pled Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI)’s lack of standing and the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the above two documents filed on April 10, 2012. However, Judge Koetter either never read my pleadings or just ignored them, thinking that I would go away after the courthouse door was shut on me!!!

Unbeknownst to his honor, I am as persistent as he!

One thing of the many things that I know about Jesse Jackson, he is persistent. —Jackie Jackson

Well, one thing of the many things that I know about Judge Koetter, he is persistent. He is persistent in conducting ex parte communications with lawyers because he is good at communication and fundraising!

“Thank you for ruling in favor of my clients! How much do I owe you, your honor!”

“Ex parte exchanges are prohibited. Let’s find some place else to talk about it, counselor!”

“The Commission concludes from the facts and evidence presented that Judge Koetter engaged in an improper ex parte communication with Jones concerning a contested issue in a pending case, which resulted in the entry of a judgment in favor of Jones without affording Whatley the right to be heard. In reaching its decision, the Commission took into account the fact that Judge Koetter had been sanctioned previously for engaging in similar conduct. In this case, the Commission concludes that Judge Koetter’s conduct, as described herein, constituted a willful or persistent violation of Canon 3B(8) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct.” See PUBLIC ADMONITION by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

Some secret documents containing type-written orders with tickets of one-hundred dollar bills. No receipt requested, your honor.

Like him, I am persistent. And I believe Bennett Miller, who said: “I think the mind has a way of getting to where it needs to get to. If you are persistent.”  My mind needs to get to where it can beat war drums loud and clear—“The most persistent sound which reverberates through man’s history is the beating of war drums.” — Arthur Koestler

Got the message, all the crooked officers of the court, Queen of Fraud Anita L. Koop, and Kingpin of Trickery Terry J. Cox?

This is my declaration of war against injustice!

I can be jailed again at any time, it is very easy. They can say I am a criminal and just lock me up. Chen Guangcheng  To my good luck, I am not in China! But if I should go to court, they would treat me what this Mr. Chen was treated in China. That’s why I only appear at court by well-pled legal papers. They have to argue with me on paper, but they are unmeritorious in every respect; that’s why people like Mr. Koetter has remained silent despite my repeated attacks and challenges to a duel in court! Or Messrs. Roberts & Hill would have sued me for defamation a long time ago!

Genuine gold fears no fire! — Chinese Proverb

**********************************************************************************

Lacking Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter, or of the Parties, or Violating Due Process

1. Judgment is a “void judgment” if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. See also, Platt v. Platt, 815 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Mo. App. 1991)(quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary 1574 (6th Ed. 1990)). If a judgment does NOT pass the above three-prong test, it is definitely a “void judgment”.

Here, (1) Judge Koetter has had no subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have had no standing to sue in that all the Warranty Deeds issued to them by the factually and legally non-existent corporation, Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI), are invalid, null and without any legal force. They must be set aside. Thus, there is no subject matter jurisdiction because there is no issue before the court for adjudication. (See MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SHERIFF’S DEED REAL ESTATE, ALL THE VOID WARRANTY DEEDS ISSUED BY ANITA’S RESORT PROPERTIES, INC., THE VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, AND TO CHANGE VENUE, OR TO REMOVE TO THE FEDERAL COURT Posted on August 23, 2012 by ricofraudonthecourt. (2) Since Plaintiffs have no standing, there are no parties and there can be no waiver of the issue or conferred jurisdiction by consent. See Matter of City of Ft. Wayne, (1978) 178 Ind. App. 228, 381 N.E.2d 1093, 1095. (3) In rendering THE ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, Judge Koetter acted in a manner inconsistent with due process because absent subject matter and personal jurisdictions, he had no authority to preside over this case, and he rendered a void judgment when he had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to render judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990).
2. A judgment is void if it is shown that the court lacked jurisdiction 1) over a party or the property; 2) over the subject matter; 3) to enter a particular judgment; or 4) to act as a court. Jurisdiction could not be conferred by waiver or retroactively. ELNA PFEFFER ET AL. v. ALVIN MEISSNER ET AL. (11/23/55) 286 S.W.2d 241.

In this case, Judge Koetter lacked jurisdiction 1) over the parties in dispute or the property unlawfully auctioned and illegally occupied; 2) over the subject matter of unlawful dominion and control of the lots rightfully belonging to the Taiwanese Lot Owners; 3) to enter THE ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION; or 4) to act as a court where neither parties nor issues of controversy are properly before the court for adjudication. Furthermore, jurisdiction could neither be conferred on the court by waiver or consent of the parties nor retroactively. See Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668]; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408].) Neither by acquiescence nor consent. See CHERYL PHYLIS MARSHALL v. GARY LYNN, SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA 1992.NE.107, 482 N.W.2d 1, 240 Neb. 322, March 27, 1992.

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

Judge Koetter’s ORDER OF DISMISSAL has No Arguable Basis in Law or in Fact!

This is excerpted from the VERIFIED MOTION TO VOID ORDER OF DISMISSAL filed on July 11, 2014, but returned by the Clerk on July 14, 2014, asking Chen to file a motion for leave to file from the District Judge.                                       

That calls to mind the scenario where the catcher also plays the role of an umpire!

Can you imagine the irony of asking one of the Defendants in my $75 million  cause of action for permission to file my Motion to Vacate  the 6 VOID Orders/Judgments he rendered without jurisdiction, power, or authority?

I. NO ARGUABLE BASIS IN LAW OR IN FACT

1. Having no arguable basis in law or in fact, the June 17, 2014 ORDER OF DISMISSAL is erroneous for the following reasons: ATTACHMENT #A) Please refer to: JUDGE JUERGEN (SKIPPER) KOETTER: My readers were wrong! So was I! Posted on July 15, 2014.

Two Clerical/Administrative/Ministerial: Citing the non-existent Court order of October 5, 2010 and mistaking Salyer the ADA for Hill the lawyer.

Numerous Judicial Errors: Misinterpretation of Frivolousness and Vexatiousness, Order founded upon 11/30/2010 invalid SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Plaintiffs Lacked Standing, Judge Koetter Lacked Jurisdiction, Misapplication of Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code, Fraud upon the Court, Violations of Canons 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, Bribery Statute 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), Open Courts Doctrine of ART. 1 SEC. 13, Art 5 – Sec 1-a of Texas Constitution, the 1st & 14^{th AMENDMENTS TO THE US CONSTITUTION, SECTION 1983 ACTIONS AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW, Rules 18b(b)(1) & 145 of TRCP, Rendition of over 5 VOID Orders/Judgments, among others.}

This Court’s alleged order of October 5, 2010 is non-existent.

Chen has no binding obligation to comply with any VOID Order.

2. “The Court, having reviewed the pleadings filed by Paul Chen, finds that Mr. Chen has not complied with this Court’s order of October 5, 2010 in failing to obtain leave of court prior to filing the pleadings.” No Court order of October 5, 2010 exists in the docket. The entire record shows that no hearing or order involved Chen between July 17 and November 29, 2010. Based in part on the non-existent Court order of October 5, 2010, this ORDER OF DISMISSAL was VOID ab initio. Not until 11/30/2010 did the Court render a summary judgment without Chen’s participation in the hearing where Plaintiffs lacked standing and the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the 11/30/2010 summary judgment was inevitably VOID ab initio. Even if this is considered merely a clerical error, and may be corrected in the open court, the judicial error on standing and jurisdiction was incurable because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as clearly and unambiguously pled in the VERIFIED MOTION TO REOPEN, this VERIFIED AMENDED MOTION TO REOPEN, and Chen’s previous pleadings in the record. “A void judgment does not create any binding obligation. Federal decisions addressing void state court judgments include Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed 370; Ex parte Rowland (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861. Consequently, Chen has no binding obligation to comply with this or any other VOID Order.

3. The ORDER OF DISMISSAL of June 17, 2014 was cc to Shannon Salyer, ADA, who is not Plaintiffs’ counsel on record. This is not a criminal case, and such blunders demonstrate how poorly and carelessly Judge Koetter’s professional competence is maintained! On the COVER page, printed in 14-point Times New Roman font, are the name and address of Plaintiffs’ counsel:

PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL: Randal W. Hill

P.O. Box 1697

Corpus Christi, Texas 78403

Corpus Christi, Texas (Main Office):

802 N. Carancahua, Suite 450

Corpus Christi, TX 78401

He looks like Randall W. Hill, the attorney who misled, deceived, and defrauded the court.

4. Clerical mistakes in a judgment may be corrected in open court, and the trial court may render judgment nunc pro tunc according to the truth or justice of the case. Tex. R. Civ. P. 316. Judicial error is error that occurs in the rendering, as opposed to the entering, of a judgment. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 1986). A trial court may only correct by judgment nunc pro tunc entry of a final written judgment that incorrectly states the judgment actually rendered. Id.

5. Citing the non-existent Court order of October 5, 2010 and mistaking Salyer the ADA for Hill the lawyer may be construed as clerical errors to be corrected in open court; finding Chen’s pleadings frivolous founded upon the invalid 11/30/10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT is a callous, capricious, arbitrary, discriminatory judicial error, deliberately indifferent to Chen’s constitutional, statutory, legal and equitable rights. Both clerical mistakes and judicial errors subject the rulings null, void, and without any legal force.

Judicial Error: Misinterpretation of Frivolousness and Vexatiousness

6. “The Court also finds the pleadings are frivolous under Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedy Code.” — This is a judicial error in that Chen has refuted the allegation of frivolousness and vexatiousness in at least two motions filed in the record, i.e., a) Vexatious Litigants and Frivolous Lawsuits: The 61 paragraphs in AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION filed on May 10, 2013 in this case focus on refuting Judge Koetter’s erroneous ruling labeling Chen a vexatious litigant filing frivolous lawsuits. b) See 182-191of VERIFIED AMENDED MOTION TO REOPEN filed on July 11, 2014.

7. Whether Chen’s pleadings are frivolous under Chapter 13, Texas Civil Practices & Remedy Code is not to be determined by such a conclusory statement without any evidence simply based on a VOID Summary Judgment. Chen’s 64-page, 7,328-word VERIFIED MOTION TO REOPEN is self-evident and self-explanatory. It is meritorious and substantiated by sufficient facts and ample controlling case law, rules, statutes, Texas and US Constitutional Provisions. The submitted MOTION took Chen more than five months, 15 hours per day, seven days a week, based on ten years’ untiring legal research, consuming one laser toner cartridge, and three 500-sheet reams of printing paper (Double-Sided Printing in Safe Toner Mode) after undergoing countless revisions.

Founded upon invalid SUMMARY JUDGMENT, this ORDER is VOID ab initio.

8. The ORDER OF DISMISSAL, founded upon the invalid 11/30/10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT, is VOID ab initio. Besides, it was rendered without hearing the Movant/Affiant or giving him an opportunity to be heard; it is not a judicial determination of his rights. Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.

9. World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980): “A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733 (1878).”

10. “A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its wants of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power to do so exists.” People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448]. “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1Freeman on Judgments, 120c.) An illegal order is forever void.

11. A “void” judgment, as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97 (10/13/58).

12. “Orders issued by a court without jurisdiction are void, and we are under an affirmative duty to vacate void orders without reaching the merits of the issues on appeal.” Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 WL 3202769, at *2 (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b); First American Trust Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co. L.P., 59 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).

13. Tainted by both clerical and judicial errors, this ORDER OF DISMISSAL is merely a piece of waste paper, an absolute nullity. See Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). “A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity.” Also, a void judgment has been defined as “one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at anytime and at any place directly or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758). It has also been held that “It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or, collateral.” Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.).

II. PLEA OF JURISDICTION & SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs Lacked Standing and Judge Koetter Lacked Jurisdiction

14. Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction, any Order or Judgment rendered by Judge Koetter was VOID ab initio! It can be attacked at any time in any proceedings!

Plaintiffs Lacked Standing

15. [A] decision concerning whether a party has standing is not a decision deciding the merits of a case. See Bland Independent School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554. “A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Id. Without subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court must dismiss the case. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 805, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 122 (Tex. 2001). Dismissal is the appropriate disposition when a party lacks standing; it is not a decision on the merits of the case.

16. Whitworth v. Whitworth, NO. 01-04-01026-CV , 222 S.W.3d 616; 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2238, Tex, Ct. App., 1st Dist., Houston, March 16, 2007): Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 S.W.3d at 853; Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, no pet.). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 443 (Tex. 1993) (“TAB”).

17. Standing, as a necessary component of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit under Texas law. Id. at 444; In re C.M.C. & J.T.C., 192 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2006) (orig. proceeding).

18. Standing in Texas state court requires (a) “a real controversy between the parties” that (b) “will be actually determined by the declaration sought.” Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. No real controversy existed between Chen and the Plaintiffs, which would be actually determined by the declaration sought because the latter has never had standing. Therefore, all the challenged Orders/Judgments are VOID ab initio. They may be vacated with Chen’s motions or the court can and must set them aside sua sponte.

19. Confronted with the plea of jurisdiction, this Court has to prove that it has jurisdiction, power or authority to render a VOID Order/Judgment when the Plaintiffs lack standing and the Court has neither subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction. A court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. 2007). Plaintiffs, Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., a defunct corporation, and others, lack standing, and Judge Koetter has no jurisdiction, power or authority to hear the cases.

The couple, Terry J. Cox & Anita L. Koop, specialize in fraud, scam, cheat, and theft!

 

Judge Koetter Lacked Jurisdiction

20. The ORDER OF DISMISSAL is VOID ab initio because this Court lacked jurisdiction 1) over a party or the property; 2) over the subject matter; 3) to enter a particular judgment; or 4) to act as a court. Jurisdiction could not be conferred by waiver or retroactively[.] See Elna Pfeffer et al. v. Alvin Meissner et al. (11/23/55) 286 S.W.2d 241; Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990).

21. Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case and is never presumed. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443–44. The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 446.

22. In any judicial proceeding, the moving party has the burden of proof of demonstrating that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matters and parties before it. See the following authorities: Scott v. Sandford, ^{60 U.S. 393 (1856) ; Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U.S. 211 (2002); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization Et. Al., 307 U.S. 496 (59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 36454 L.Ed. 2d 376 (1977); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization Et. Al., 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1979); Cannon v. University Chicago Et. Al., 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Patsy v. Board Regents State Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982); Merrill Lynch v. Curran Et Al., 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (1982); Insurance Corporation Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492, 50 U.S.L.W. 4553 (1982); Matt T. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company America, 128 L.Ed.2d 391, 62 U.S.L.W. 4313 (1994).}

23. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to act. See Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 448 n.2 (Tex. 1996). The plaintiff bears the burden to plead facts affirmatively demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d at 642 (Tex. 2007). A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that is intended to defeat a cause of action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regardless of whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).

24. A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge either the pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts. Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-27 (Tex. 2004).

25. When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court must consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W. 3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges jurisdictional facts, we consider the evidence submitted by the parties to address the jurisdictional issues raised. Id. Though Chen’s plea to the jurisdiction challenged jurisdictional facts, the Court never considered the evidence submitted by Chen to address the jurisdictional issues raised.

26. In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, a court may not consider the merits of the case, but only the plaintiff’s pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges plaintiff’s pleadings, the determination pivots on whether the pleader has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Id. We construe pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and look to the pleader’s intent. City of Carrollton v. Singer, 232 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied). When the pleadings neither allege sufficient facts nor demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). Chen’s pleadings both allege sufficient facts and demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is not one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should not be afforded the opportunity to amend. Chen’s pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction; the plea to the jurisdiction must be granted without leave to amend. Id.

27. “If evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.” Id. at 227-28. If evidence had created a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the fact issue should have been resolved by the fact finder. However, the Court merely used a few lines of callous, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, conclusory statements to dismiss Chen’s 64-page, 7,328-word, well-pled VERIFIED MOTION TO REOPEN without giving any reasons. Fact questions, if any, lie in founding the ORDER OF DISMISSAL on the non-existent October 5, 2010 Order, and mistaking the Assistant District Attorney Shannon Salyer for Plaintiffs’ counsel Randal W. Hill, printed in large type on the COVER of Chen’s Motion.

28. “Every court confronted with a law suit of any kind is under both the necessity and the duty of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and it necessarily has jurisdiction to make this determination.” (internal quotations and citations omitted. See Clawson et ux v. Prouty et ux, 215 Ore. 244, 249, 333 P.2d 1104 (1959). Judge Koetter was under both the necessity and the duty of determining whether or not he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit; however, he did nothing. He erroneously presumed that he had jurisdiction despite Plaintiffs’ lack of standing, not knowing “Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 443-44. If a party lacks standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 444; In re C.M.C., 192 S.W.3d at 869. Upon a finding that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the suit. Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

29. “Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action. Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026. The Court’s jurisdiction has been repeatedly challenged by Chen, the court should not have proceeded when it clearly appeared that the court lacked jurisdiction, the court had no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should have dismissed the action.

30. “If it develops in the course of a proceeding that the court does not have jurisdiction in the particular case, any order except one dismissing the proceeding is void.” “The court could do nothing but dismiss the proceeding.” See People v. Shurtleff, 355 Ill. 210, 189 N.E.2d 291 (1933). Judge Koetter continued rendering VOID Orders/Judgments for Plaintiffs despite Chen’s repeated challenges of the court’s jurisdiction resulting from Plaintiff’s lack of standing.

31. Under the Supreme Law of the Land, whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S.200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19U.S.(6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821). Thus, you are qualified to be named traitor of the year.

 

 

**********************************************************************************

Sooner or later, we sell out for money. — Tony Randall

Men make counterfeit money; in many more cases, money makes counterfeit men.— Sydney J. Harris

Men make counterfeit money; in many more cases, money makes corrupt officers of the court, e.g, Juergen “Skipper” Koetter, Kemper Stephen Williams, John D. Rainey, Janis Graham Jack, David Roberts, Randall W. Hill, Richard T. Chapman, and the other attorneys representing Anita L. Koop and Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. since June 6, 1993 when it became legally and factually non-existent. — Paul Chen

Don’t peep! Peeping is unfair!                $50? How about $5,000?

Your impartiality

might be reasonably questioned!

Money talks!

The Justice Lady may be blind, may be not!

 

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

P.S. Some readers contacted me and complained about the lengthy posts. I am sorry, but the two Motions I filed or tried to file consist of 48 pages of VERIFIED MOTION TO VOID ORDER OF DISMISSAL & 64 pages of  VERIFIED AMENDED MOTION TO REOPEN.  My cases are too complicated to make the pleadings short!

 

 

 

 

 

 

Judge Skipper Koetter: You should have recused yourself a long time ago!

A “judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which: (a) his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2).

The facts demonstrate that Judge Skipper Koetter’s impartiality was reasonably questionable.

1. Before the July 15, 2010 hearing, without any probable cause, without a warrant for arrest, and against  LIS PENDENS law for two alleged crimes Chen didn’t commit, ADA Shannon Salyer and Sheriff B.B. Browning had Chen handcuffed,  falsely arrested, and wrongfully imprisoned for 34 days prohibiting him from accessing any legal files to prepare for the hearing.

3. Because of Chen’s affirmative defense with 87+ controlling Texas precedents on the ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE enjoyed by the filers of NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS, the two criminal charges were eventually dismissed without any hearing after a two-year delay and at a cost of $15,000 attorney’s fees and substantial tangible and intangible losses. Thus, Chen, in response to the DA’s settlement proposal, demanded $75 million of damages, payable in 75 years to a charity of Chen’s choice. The demand is pending in the Section 1983 action. See “Absolute Privilege of Filing Notices of Lis Pendens v. Texas Penal Code – Section 32.49. Refusal To Execute Release Of Fraudulent Lien Or Claim” Posted on October 5, 2012.

4. Allowing Chen 4 business days to subpoena the potential witnesses, who evaded process services, and little time to prepare for his affirmative defenses, Judge Koetter violated Chen’s due process right under the 14^th Amendment and Open Courts Doctrine under the Texas Constitution.

5. On July 15, 2010, the hearing began at 9 a.m., and ended at 10:00 a.m. in the Notices of Lis Pendens case.

6. After the hearing, Judge Koetter called Roberts and the Plaintiffs’ attorneys to the bench excluding Chen from the post-hearing ex parte exchanges, and signed a type-written document, the purported Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, prepared by the Plaintiffs’ attorneys before the hearing without changing a word despite Chen’s argument that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction, which should have necessitated him to require that Plaintiffs carry the burden of proving the court’s jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and determine the case. Otherwise, the only alternative was to stop the hearing and dismiss the case. See Judge Skipper Koetter: You are constitutionally disqualified! July 19, 2014.

7. The proposed order/judgment was entered at 10:07 a.m. without allowing Chen to participate in the post-hearing conference, to review the proposed order/judgment, and to respond to it.

8. Within ten days, Chen filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was flatly denied by Judge Koetter without giving any reason.

9. If there had been a rehearing, Chen would have presented the 87+ controlling precedents on Notices of Lis Pendens (See 3. above) to defeat the purported Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which was not only in contravention of the guiding rules and principles but also arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

A Judgment Violating a Citizen’s Right to Due Process is Void.

The proceedings depicted above evidently violated Chen’s due process right. Therefore, it is VOID ab initio because “A judgment issued from a proceeding that violates a citizen’s right to due process is void.” State v. Rehbein, 235 Neb. 536, 455 N.W.2d 821 (1990); State v. Von Dorn, 234 Neb. 93, 449 N.W.2d 530 (1989); State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d 609 (1975); In re Application of Maher, North v. Dorrance, 144 Neb. 484, 13 N.W.2d 653 (1944); In re Betts, 36 Neb. 282, 54 N.W. 524 (1893).

The requirements of due process not only include notice, but also include an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, and judicial review. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).

I have been fighting for justice and for fairness and freedom of speech for the past ten years. Fairness and justice should be the base of your rulings, your honor.

Scale of justice and fairness in the court of law.

These men ask for just the same thing, fairness, and fairness only. This, so far as in my power, they, and all others, shall have. — Abraham Lincoln

Fairness is what justice really is. — Potter Stewart

I’m a lawyer. I go for due process; I go for fairness and equity – these values mean a lot to me. — Mohamed ElBaradei — I believe there are many good judges and attorneys like you out there, Mohamed. I am just focusing on the bad apples only!

Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994, 158 F.R.D. 278.

A void judgment may be set aside at any time and in any proceeding. VonSeggern v. Willman, 244 Neb. 565, 508 N.W.2d 261 (1993); Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992); State v. Ewert; Ehlers v. Grove, 147 Neb. 704, 24 N.W.2d 866 (1946); Hayes County v. Wileman, 82 Neb. 669, 118 N.W. 478 (1908).

Judge Koetter has an “affirmative obligation” to assure Chen “meaningful access to the courts.”  — Any reasonable person can see that the 7/15/2010 court appearance cannot qualify for “meaningful access to the court.”

In Johnson v. Avery the Supreme Court held that prisoners’ access to the courts “may not be denied or obstructed.” 7 393U.S.483, 485 (1969). Neither may this indigent pro se Plaintiff’s access to the courts be denied or obstructed.

In Bounds v. Smith the Court held that prison authorities have an “affirmative obligation[ ]” to assure prisoners “meaningful access to the courts.” 430U.S. at 824. Here, Judge Koetter has an “affirmative obligation” to assure this indigent pro se litigant “meaningful access to the courts.”

Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation. Bounds v. Smith 430 U.S.at 825–26.

In this case, unless proof of liability and damages are determined in an adversary proceeding with full opportunity to Plaintiff to participate, an action on a judgment obtained against Plaintiff is to be precluded. “No judge can conceive of Plaintiff being held liable on a judgment rendered in a case in which he did not participate fully and as an adversary.” See Grundy County v. Dyer, 546 S.W.2d 577.

Prohibited ex parte communications undermine the public’s confidence in our judicial system and thwart due process rights.

The ex parte communications between Judge Koetter, Roberts and Plaintiffs’ attorneys excluding Chen from all such communications demonstrate a violation of Canon 3B(8), and manifest impartiality against Chen in this case.

“Our adversarial system of justice, grounded in the principle of an impartial judiciary, becomes compromised when one-sided, closed-door, in-chambers discussions with trial judges are encouraged.” In re S.A.G., 403 S.W.3d 907, 914 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. filed). For this reason, all attorneys are prohibited from engaging in ex parte communications, and judges “shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications or other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties between the judge and a party [or] an attorney . . . concerning the merits of a pending or impending judicial proceeding.” Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3(B)(8), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B; see Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.05, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013). Our justice system’s prohibition of ex parte communications is purposeful. In re S.A.G., 403 S.W.3d at 914.

Private adjudications fly in the face of our judicial system’s abiding commitment to providing public access to civil and criminal proceedings and records. Our form of government is rooted in a recognition of the importance of open and public proceedings. Subjecting judicial proceedings to public scrutiny accomplishes two important goals. First, it provides the public with an opportunity to exercise its right to monitor and evaluate its judicial system. Second, and equally important, a judge’s knowledge that his or her actions are not shrouded in secrecy fosters a stronger commitment to strict conscientiousness in the performance of judicial duties. Our courts have recognized that secret tribunals exhibit abuses that are absent when the public has access to judicial proceedings and records. The judiciary has no special privilege to suppress or conduct in private proceedings involving the adjudication of causes before it. In fact, such secrecy frustrates the judiciary’s responsibility to promote and provide fair and equal treatment to all parties. Individual judges are charged with the task of adjudicating claims in a manner that protects the rights of both parties. A judge’s private communications with either party undermine the public’s right to evaluate whether justice is being done and removes an important incentive to the efficient resolution of cases. In re Thomas, 873 S.W.2d 477, 496-97 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994) (citations omitted).

For these reasons, the Texas Supreme Court strives for judicial transparency in our legal system. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex. 2009). “Ex parte communications do not promote that transparency,” In re S.A.G., 403 S.W.3d at 914, and in a case such as this, where Chen suffered financial loss of $34,999,640.91 evidenced from the Creditors Matrix in Case Number: 96-24925 as of 11/25/1996, as a result of the wrongful foreclosure by the crooked couple, Anita L. Koop and Terry J. Cox. To ensure a fair trial for Chen’s $75 million damages claim, private communications cannot be tolerated. To suggest otherwise would undermine the integrity of courts, breed skepticism and distrust, and thwart principles on which our judicial system is based. See Matter of J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 1996) (citing In re Thomas, 873 S.W.2d at 496).

Ex parte communications call into question a court’s impartiality.

When a judge engages in ex parte communications, his impartiality is subject to question. The preamble to the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Provides:

Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law. Intrinsic to all sections of this Code of Judicial Conduct are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law.

Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Preamble. Canons 1 and 2 establish a high standard of conduct for judges in order to promote the integrity of the judiciary and require judges to comply with the law and act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Cannon 1, 2(A).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) protects the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary by requiring a judge to recuse in any proceeding where “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “The standard is ‘whether an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.’” In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 144, 455(a) (judge’s “impartiality might be reasonably questioned) and Christo v. Padgett, 233 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)). The judge’s intentions or motivations for engaging in the ex parte communications are irrelevant to the inquiry; rather, the inquiry is an objective one which asks whether the judge’s exchange of ex parte communications with Plaintiffs’ counsel would raise in the mind of a fully informed lay observer questions regarding his impartiality. The answer to that question here can only be “yes.”  The Judge’s conduct in this case demonstrates that “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

The judge’s appearance of impartiality is undoubtedly questionable in view of the trial by ambush, the $5,900.10 bribe, reward, or gift under the guise of campaign contributions, the obvious spoken/body language of partiality and favoritism, and the private meeting after the hearing without Chen’s participation constituted improper ex parte communications and willful or persistent violations of Canon 3(B)(8).

The ex parte communications between Judge Koetter, Roberts and Plaintiffs’ attorneys affected Judge Koetter’s direct pecuniary, personal interest in the case’s outcome in that he was named one of the Defendants in Chen’s Section 1983 civil rights action together with Judge Williams. The public admonition against Judge Koetter tells us all about his willful or persistent violations of Canon 3B(8).  See e.g. COMM. ON JUD. CONDUCT, CJC No. 12-0846-DI (the matter of the Honorable Juergen (Skipper) Koetter (issuing a public admonition against the judge based on violation of Canon 3B(8) prohibiting ex parte communications on contested matters pending before the court.

Not only did this exchange create the potential for abuse, it was patently unfair to Chen, who  was excluded from the ongoing colloquy between Roberts/Plaintiffs’ attorneys and the judge and had no “ample opportunity” to argue for or against the findings. See In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1987); see also In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1311 (“When an interested party is permitted to draft a judicial order without response by or notice to the opposing side, the temptation to overreach and exaggerate is overwhelming.”).

The exchanges, on their face, would cause any fully-informed lay person to at least question the judge’s impartiality.

Hey, counselor! Your cash should be concealed!

Don’t let your opponents see the greenbacks, OK?

 

Harm is presumed here, and given the nature of the ex parte communications, that presumption cannot be rebutted.

No showing of harm from the judge’s lack of impartiality is required; it is presumed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18 (no express requirement of harm); Tex. R. Civ. P. 327 (expressly requires showing of harm arising from jury misconduct); see Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230 (1954) (in criminal matter, private communication, direct or indirect, with juror after the beginning of trial is deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made with full knowledge of all parties and pursuant to court order or rule). As one state court has noted:

[A] prejudice standard is not always appropriate. There are certain attorney-juror contacts which happen during trial, “which if permitted to stand would shake the confidence of laymen in the fairness of judicial proceedings.” In such circumstances we must find reversible error regardless of a showing of actual prejudice. In cases of such gross impropriety, our concern is not with the contact’s potential influence on a discrete verdict; rather we seek to protect against the “confidence-shaking effect upon future cases, which would result from appellate disregard of such events.” Colosimo v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 486 A.2d 1378, 1381, 337 Pa.Super 363, 369 (1984)(citations omitted).

Here, the recusal rule does not require a showing of harm. Certainly, the Texas Supreme Court could have included such a requirement in the rule, but it chose not to, presumably because the appearance of impartiality is so important to the public’s confidence in the legal system. Moreover, communications such as those at issue here shake the confidence of any layman in the fairness of the process. The appearance of impropriety alone is sufficient to warrant recusal.

Because the judge is the fact finder, serving in the capacity as a jury otherwise would, the presumption of prejudice when jurors and either counsel or the judge confer ex parte should apply to the communications here. See State v. Washington, 626 So.2d 841 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993); State v. Bates, 508 So.2d 1346 (La.1987) (per curiam).

The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action. Rather, it is a question of whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex.Comm.App.1939, opinion adopted). Another way of stating the test is whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.1982); Landry v. Travelers Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.1970).

To determine the trial judge’s guiding rules and principles in rendering an ORDER OF DIMISSAL, the Court must look to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as promulgated and amended by the Texas Supreme Court as well as the decisions of appellate courts of this State and of the United States.

Under these particular facts, and with the inherent risk to the propriety of judgments when a court and one side to the litigation work toward a certain result, a court considering a recusal motion must assume prejudice.

Even in those cases where courts have reviewed whether questions regarding a judge’s impartiality affected the litigation’s outcome, they have only required the complaining party to show “probable prejudice.” Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Tex. 1987); Pitt v. Bradford Farms, 843 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.)(citing Andrews v. Dewberry, 242 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1951, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

The communications here clearly involved the merits of the litigation before the judge. Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Cannon 3(B)(8). Moreover, they involve fewer than all the parties legally entitled to be present, and merits decision was dependent on ex parte communications. See In the Interest of T.D.M.C., No. 12-03-00300-CV, 2005 WL 1000578, *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler, April 29, 2005, no pet.)

Litigants are not only entitled to a fair-minded judge but also to a judge with the unquestioned appearance of fairness. Rule 18(b) provides that recusal is mandatory in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 SW2d 799 (Tex. App. – El Paso, 1993, denied), Chief Justice Max Osborn supported the adoption of the Kansas Supreme Court rule affecting questionable impartiality of a judge, that is, whether a reasonable person on the street, with adequate knowledge of the facts would question the judge’s impartiality. The Texas Supreme Court cited that concurrence in Rogers v. Bradley, 909 SW2d 872 (Tex. 1995), stating that courts should evaluate a motion to recuse from a disinterested observer’s point of view.

Recusal is appropriate if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts as to the judge’s impartiality, Rosas v. State, 76 SW3d 771 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no writ).

The U.S. Supreme Court opinion held that the common law rule of recusal due to pecuniary interest implicates due process when the circumstances present a temptation to the judge to decide the case on a basis other than a fair and impartial evaluation. Actual bias is not the test and need not be established.

Due process requires recusal if there is a serious risk of actual bias when the one with a personal stake in the outcome of the case had “a significant and disproportionate” influence in placing the judge on the case.

Texas law has long been that a judge is neither disqualified nor subject to recusal because of campaign contributions, Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 SW2d 77 (Tex. Ap. – San Antonio 1983, no writ) and Degarmo v. State, 922 SW2d 256 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th District] 1996, Ref.) and the Massey case does hold that not every campaign contribution by a litigant or an attorney would necessitate recusal unless the circumstances rise to an unconstitutional probability of bias. Judge Koetter’s repeated violations of Canon 3B(8), prohibiting ex parte communications on contested matters pending before the court, rose to an unconstitutional probability of bias necessitating recusal .

In determining whether to recuse a judge, the inquiry should be whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial. See Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W. 3d 611, 613-614 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2000). See, e.g., Williams, 65 S.W. 3d at 687; Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 S.W. 2d 265, 281 (Tex. App. Houston 1997), Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 804-805 (Tex. App. El Paso 1993) (Osborn, C.J., concurring), Woodruff v. Wright, 51 S.W. 3d 727, 736 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2001).

The statutory language mandates recusal whenever impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Tex. R. C. P. 18(b)(2)(a). There is no requirement that partiality be demonstrated. Rather, the “appearance” of impropriety is sufficient to trigger recusal. See Woodruff, 51 S.W. 3d at 738. The “trial court’s duty [is] to determine whether the movant [has] provided facts sufficient to establish that a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts involved in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.” Richardson v. State, 83 S.W. 3d 332, 358 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2002). See also, Degarmo v. State, 922 S.W. 2d 256, 267 (Tex. App. Houston Dist. 1996) (determining that the issue is whether the movant has provided facts sufficient to establish that a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances involved, would harbor doubts about the impartiality of the trial judge). 2 The appearance of impartiality standard is by no means unique to the Texas courts. See, e.g., Ham v. State, 540 So. 2d 805, 807-808 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (no reasonable basis to question judge’s impartiality); Giralt v. Vail Village Inn Assoc., 759 P.2d 801, 804 (Colo. App. 1988) (court must eliminate every semblance of reasonable doubt as to its impartiality); LaBow v. LaBow, 13 Conn. App. 330, 334 537 A. 2d 157, 161 (Conn. App. 1988) (controlling standard is whether reasonable person who is aware of all circumstances would question impartiality); Scott v. United States, 559 A. 2d 745, 754 (D.C. App. 1989) (appearance of partiality is sufficient); Weber v. State, 547 A. 2d 948, 952 (Del. Super 1988) (disqualification required when impartiality might reasonably be questioned); Love v. State, 569 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. App. 1990) (ex parte communications violates appearance of impartiality); Isaacs v. State, 257 Ga. 126, 355 S.E. 2d 644 (Ga. 1987) (fact that judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned is sufficient for disqualification); People v. DelVecchio, 129 Ill. 2d 265, 275, 544 N.E. 2d 312, 317, 135 Ill. Dec. 816, 821 (Ill. App. 1989) (guiding principle is whether the average person, acting as judge, could not hold nice, clear, and true balance between the State and the accused); State v. Strayer, 242 Kan. 618, 625-626, 750 P. 2d 390, 396 (Kan. 1988) (question whether facts create a reasonable doubt not in judge’s or litigant’s mind but in mind of a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts); Pierce v. Charity Hosp. of Louisiana at New Orleans, 550 So. 2d 211, 215 (La. App. 1989) (facts must show that observer could reasonably perceive that court was biased); Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 86, 581 A. 2d 1, 9, (Md. 1990) (test is whether reasonable person knowing and understanding all the facts would recuse judge); Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W. 2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986) (where circumstances give bona fide appearance of bias judge should recuse); Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So. 2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986) (recusal warranted if reasonable person would harbor doubts about impartiality); Commonwealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 339, 529 A. 2d 1085, 1088 (Pa. Super. 1987) (recusal is required whenever there is substantial doubt as to a jurist’s ability to preside impartially); State v. Neeley, 748 P. 2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988) (a judge should recuse himself when his “impartiality” might reasonably be questioned) ; State v. Brown, 177 W. Va. 633, 641, 355 S.E. 2d 614, 622 (W. Va. 1987) (where a challenge to a judge’s impartiality is made for substantial reasons which indicate that the circumstances offer a possible temptation as to the average man as a judge not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, a judge should recuse himself).

Lady justice

Which of the two ladies of justice possesses the unquestioned appearance of fairness, the one who can see how much gold is put on the scale or the other who is blindfolded?

And whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned?

 

Lady Justitia

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

Judge Skipper Koetter: You are constitutionally disqualified!

Judge Koetter: I sued you on May 10, 2013, and on May 15, 2013, you signed a Summary Judgment against me by being misled, deceived, and defrauded by Randall W. Hill, Plaintiffs’ counsel. RANDAL W. HILL’S PERJURY & SUMMARY JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH SKIPPER KOETTER Posted on May 18, 2013.

Wait a second, your honor! Please sign the order I prepared in advance of the hearing so that I can show my client MISSION ACCOMPLISHED!

Here you go!

In fact, besides pleading Plaintiffs’ lack of standing and your lack of subject matter jurisdiction, I sued you for civil rights violations on June 5, 2012. See AMENDED Cover Letter + PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 Posted on May 23, 2013, and on August 27, 2012, I filed MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SHERIFF’S DEED REAL ESTATE, ALL THE VOID WARRANTY DEEDS ISSUED BY ANITA’S RESORT PROPERTIES, INC., THE VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, AND TO CHANGE VENUE, OR TO REMOVE TO THE FEDERAL COURT Posted on August 23, 2012, in which you were one of the Defendants.

When you were sued, you became a party to the proceedings, and you became constitutionally disqualified. Consequently, “any judgment you render is void and a nullity.”

Your VOID Orders and Judgments protected the fraudsters, e.g., Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, among others: 

 

Is the man Terry J. Cox, and the woman Anita L. Koop in disguise?

Do you understand that neither subject matter jurisdiction nor constitutional disqualification can be waived? As Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. has lacked standing since June 6, 1993, any order or judgment rendered for it is VOID ab initio. See Expiration of Assumed Name Certificate and Standing to Sue Posted on May 18, 2012 & AnitaS Resort Property, Inc. – Wysk.  Your orders and judgments, being founded upon those VOID Orders/Judgments, are worthless waste paper because  “A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities.” See Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex. Civ. App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex. Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex. Com. App., 1922). And having taken an oath to uphold the Constitution of Texas and that of the United States, your “willful or persistent” violations constitute TREASON. So you should be labeled a TRAITOR, shouldn’t you?  See Abuse and Misuse of Judicial Power, Trespassing, Usurpation, Conspiracy, Corruption, Treason, and RICO  (posted September 26, 2012). You should have been removed, not just openly reprimanded by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct!  What are the Penalties for Treason? (with pictures) – wiseGEEK  See for yourself, your dishonor!

Blind Lady Justice holding scale and sword.

In the olden days, the bloody scene was the consequence of TREASON.

Do you know the destiny of a TRAITOR in modern-day America, Mr. Koetter?

The fact that my repeated accusations  of your wrongdoings over the past two years have met with complete silence reminds me of: “Silence is the safest course for any man to adopt who distrusts himself.” — François de la Rochefoucauld

Some constitutional disqualification case law to share with you:

1. Unlike recusal, disqualification cannot be waived. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 729 S.W.2d at 312; see also Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987). If a judge is disqualified under the Texas Constitution, he is without jurisdiction to hear the case, and therefore, any judgment he renders is void and a nullity. Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.1982); Gulf Maritime, 858 S.W.2d at 559. Disqualification may be raised at any time. See Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist., 632 S.W.2d at 148. A trial court or an appellate court may raise the issue on its own motion. See Lee v. State, 555 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); City of Houston v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 530 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2. Judges shall disqualify themselves in all proceedings in which: they know that, individually or as a fiduciary, they have an interest in the subject matter in controversy. Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(1) (Vernon Supp.1995). This is one of the constitutional grounds for disqualification which cannot be waived. The Texas Constitution states three circumstances in which a judge is disqualified from sitting in a case. Article V, section 11 states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 11. Two statutes codify this mandate. The Government Code provides, in pertinent part, that a judge is disqualified from sitting in cases in which the judge is interested. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 21.005 (Vernon Supp.1995).

3. Disqualification cannot be waived and can be raised at any time. Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex .1982). As a general rule, a judge who is a party to a suit, even though he or she has not been served with process, may not preside over that case, decide any matters requiring judicial discretion, or approve the minutes of the court. Hawpe v. Smith, 22 Tex. 410 (1858). Article V, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution provides that no judge shall sit in any case wherein he or she may be interested. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 11. Likewise, Rule 18b(1) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the judges shall disqualify themselves in all proceedings in which they have an interest in the subject matter in controversy. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(b). The interest that disqualifies a judge is an interest, however small, which rests on a direct pecuniary or personal interest in the result of the case. Cameron v. Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.1979) (per curiam). If a judge is disqualified, the judge is without jurisdiction to hear the case, and therefore, any judgment rendered is void and a nullity. Buckholts Indep. School Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1982); Gulf Mar. Warehouse Co. v. Towers, 858 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Ater, 845 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).

Didn’t you ever see my pleadings? Take a look here; it’s in the record of this case, and has been posted online since 05/13/2013. Please click: AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TRESPASS …

Here, the issue is whether you have a direct pecuniary or personal interest in this case. My claims were $75 million money damages, remember? Why? I suffered financial loss in the amount of $34,999,640.91 evidenced from the Creditors Matrix in Case Number: 96-24925 on 11/25/1996 as a result of the crooked couple Terry J. Cox and Anita L. Koop’s wrongful foreclosure on 7/2/1996. Therefore, being one of the Defendants, you do have an enormous, direct, personal, pecuniary interest in this case, and you should have disqualified yourself, but you didn’t!

With so much money at stake, how can you be just and fair

if you do not play the role of the blindfolded lady of justice?

Rest assured that judicial immunity is unavailable to you because you sat on the bench without jurisdiction, power or authority resulting from Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc.’s lack of standing!

There is no such thing as justice – in or out of court. — Clarence Darrow

You almost made me believe in the above pessimistic view! Now I do believe: “Punishment is justice for the unjust.” — Saint Augustine did speak my mind because they deserve it!

I am confident that, in the end, common sense and justice will prevail. I’m an optimist, brought up on the belief that if you wait to the end of the story, you get to see the good people live happily ever after. — Cat Stevens (Cat and I speak the same language!)

The fight for justice against corruption is never easy. It never has been and never will be. It exacts a toll on our self, our families, our friends, and especially our children. In the end, I believe, as in my case, the price we pay is well worth holding on to our dignity. — Frank Serpico (Frank and I sing the same tune!)

You must be kidding, counselor! My price is a minimum of $1,000.

Take it back, and add $9,800 to it before coming back!

But you said $1,000, Skipper!

Come on, David. I awarded you $100,000 of attorneys’ fees in this case. My 10% cut is not unreasonable, David!

*************************************************************************************

How about these $100 bills, your honor? 

That’s the best we can do because we are a new small law firm!

That’s more like it! Leave the cash and leave by the back door, Mr. Rookie Lawyer!

 

“Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe.”
― Frederick Douglass

 

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen